While it is
hard to imagine, Europe's debt crisis is nearly entering its third year.
So far, Europe has managed to contain most of the damage to its own
territory; the United States, Canada and the Far East are still showing
economic growth levels that are modest but still positive and the crisis in the
bond market has not spread beyond the Eurozone. Unfortunately, everything
is still not "well"; Greece is walking a debt tightrope, Portugal and
Ireland are wards of the EU and the IMF and Spain and Italy hover near the doors of the casualty
ward with bond yields that look like this, suggesting that all is not well:
A paper by Lee C. Buchheit and G. Mitu
Gulati entitled "The Eurozone Debt Crisis - The Options Now"
give us insight regarding what tactics the Eurozone can employ to assure the
world that all is now well.
Looking back
at the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s and 1990s, the IMF enthusiastically
and predictably prescribed the same formula for debt transgressors:
1.) Raise
taxes
2.) Cut
expenditures
3.)
Restructure debt
This
"program" forced debt holders and lenders to extend their loans or
accept the consequences of a haircut to both principal and interest.
In the case
of Greece, the "program" unfolded in a far different way.
Initially, Greece basically used taxpayers' money to repay existing
lenders at par because there was a great fear of contagion as the crisis spread
to Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain. On top of that, since most of
Greece's debt was held by French and German banks, a restructuring of the debt
could have had severe negative consequences for the balance sheets of these
supposedly "strong" banks.
By the
summer of 2011, it became apparent to governments, the IMF and central banks
that they were becoming the lender of last resort to Greece. At that
point, the "official sector" began to insist that the remaining
private sector bondholders voluntarily agree to a restructuring of their claims
against Greece. The end result of this was a write-off of 53.5 percent of
the nominal amount of the debt. This process erased roughly €100 billion from Greece's outstanding debt held by the private sector.
While the
Greek debt crisis is over for the present, other nations find themselves in the
crosshairs. The IMF and EU argue that nations like Spain and Italy have
taken budgetary steps to avoid crises and that all that is required is time to
let fiscal responsibility work its way through the system. Once the bond
market notices that the newfound budgetary constraints are permanent, the
markets will reward the governments with lower interest rates on their debt.
In the
meantime, how does the world deal with nations like Spain and Italy,
potentially next in line for the "Greek treatment"? Here are
five steps that could be taken:
1.) Jolly
the Market: Politicians from the debtor countries cajole the markets that
the newfound voluntary fiscal restraint that these nations have adopted are
permanent and irreversible and that eventually, everything will be okay and the
markets will reward their good behaviour with lower interest rates.
2.) Massage
the Yields: If the first option fails and yields do not fall voluntarily,
the EU, the ECB and the IMF (the official sector) will take action in the bond
market to force yields down by purchasing additional volumes of debt so that
the debtor nations can borrow at reasonable rates. As well, the official
sector could offer a form of credit insurance, lending their "AAA"
credit rating to that of the debtor nation and pushing yields down. While
these proposals look good on paper, the ECB's purchases of bonds from Greece,
Ireland and Portugal at the beginning of the crisis did little to fix the
problem over the long haul.
3.) Full
Bailout: If the measures listed above fail, the debtor nation will require
a full bailout from the official sector will be forced to bailout the full
amount of the debt that is maturing during the period of the bailout program as
well as covering the amount of budget deficits during that time. This
avoids the dreaded "default". Unfortunately, this clearly did
not work during the initial part of the Greek bailout.
4.) Reprofiling:
If the official sector decides not to bailout existing creditors at par as they
did in stage one of the Greek crisis, restructuring of the debt is required.
This can be done by moving the maturity of the debt to some point in the
future by a fixed number of years. This avoids a painful debt haircut and
the interest owing on the debt remains at the coupon rate. This has
several advantages:
•
no loss of principal.
•
no need to fund maturing debt.
•
the private sector bears the weight of the
restructuring.
•
interest rates remain relatively low.
5.) Full
Restructuring: This is where Greece found itself in mid-2012.
Where does
the European situation stand today? Spain, with its debt of over €860
billion already finds itself at Step 2 - Massaging the Yields. In
September, the ECB began a program it called the Outright Monetary Transactions program (OMT)
which will see the ECB purchase one to three year bonds of Eurozone countries
in unlimited amounts (crank up those "printing presses") to push
prices up and yields down. This was also seen as a mechanism to reduce
the interest rate spreads between the northern Eurozone nations and their less
fiscally robust southern neighbours. Unfortunately, as shown on this
chart, the "supply of European debt is huge, particularly when Italy is
included:
There are
several significant risks to the OMT program:
1.)
Potential losses to the ECB, should they be forced to declare the
mark-to-market on their risky bond portfolio, could be staggering.
2.)
Investors will only buy the bonds at the lower yields created by the ECB
purchases if they are assured that the ECB is standing behind them.
3.) Debt
issuers may try to concentrate their bond issues at the short end of the curve
(the one to three year period) where the OMT program is pushing yields down.
As the authors state, "Why borrow for ten years at 9% when one can
borrow for two years at 3%?". This artificial distortion in the
yield curve could produce a very, very dire situation if the debt transgressing
nations choose to issue only short-term debt.
4.)
Austerity fatigue could erupt in the nations that are beneficiaries of the OMT
program. Since public resentment of austerity measures tends to rise when
organizations like the IMF, ECB and others are involved in bailouts, the ECB
could be backing itself into a corner when austerity fails.
As we can
see from this paper, Europe as a whole has backed itself into a corner where
the only options are extremely unpalatable over the long-term. The only
thing saving the world's economy right now is the pass that the United States
and Japan are being given on their $27 trillion worth of sovereign debt.
Without that, the world would be awash in a sea of worth-less
government-issued paper.
The bailouts are a Ponzi scheme and higher taxes and more austerity are not the answer. The answer in the long term is ECONOMIC GROWTH. In the short term, the Eurozone must let the PIIGS leave. The risk of Eurozone Depression is extremely great. It is not just a case of mark to market of the bad bonds held by the ECB, it is much worse as outlined below:
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