Updated April 2018
Back in September 2002, one short year after the actions of 9/11, then former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, a private citizen, spoke before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform in a hearing on Policy Toward Iraq. Here is what he had to say then:
Back in September 2002, one short year after the actions of 9/11, then former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, a private citizen, spoke before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform in a hearing on Policy Toward Iraq. Here is what he had to say then:
He stated that:
"...there was no question whatsoever that Saddam is seeking and is working
and is advancing toward the development of nuclear weapons, no question
whatsoever...and today, the United States must destroy the same regime because
a nuclear-armed Saddam will place the security of our entire world at risk.
And make no mistake about it, if and once Saddam Hussein has nuclear
weapons, the terror network will have nuclear weapons."
"Two decades ago, it was possible to thwart Saddam's nuclear ambitions by bombing a single installation, but today, nothing less than dismantling his regime will do because Saddam's nuclear program is fundamentally changed in those two decades. He no longer needs one large reactor to produce the deadly material necessary for atomic bombs. He can produce it in centrifuges the size of washing machines that can be hidden throughout the country and I want to remind you that Iraq is a very big country. It is not the size of Monte Carlo. It is a big country. And I believe that even free and unfettered inspections will not uncover these portable manufacturing sites of mass death."
Once Operation Iraqi
Freedom finished its sweep through Iraq between March 19 and May 1, 2003,
overthrowing the Hussein regime and granting power to Nouri al-Malaki, it
became quite apparent that, in fact, Iraq had no such nuclear program and that, while it had interest in developing weapons of mass destruction, it possessed none.
As background, according
to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Iraq began limited
work on its civilian nuclear program in the late 1960s once the Ba'thists took
power. In the early 1970s, then Iraqi Vice President Saddam Hussein
headed the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission and ordered the establishment of a
nuclear weapons program. The program was significantly set back in 1981
when Israel destroyed Iraq's nuclear reactor at Osirak. This action by
Israel served one purpose; it drove Iraq to an even deeper commitment to develop
nuclear weapons to protect its own interests. By 1991, Iraq did have a robust nuclear program that had
developed a complete but untested nuclear weapon and had stockpiled 36.3
kilograms of weapons-suitable highly enriched uranium. At that time, it was estimated that
Iraq was within a few years of producing a nuclear weapon. Unfortunately
for Iraq, the country's defeat at the hands of coalition forces in Desert Storm
put a quick end to Saddam's nuclear ambitions. The International Atomic
Energy Agency undertook intrusive inspections of Iraq's nuclear facilities
after the end of hostilities in 1991 and, by 1997, concluded that Iraqi weapons
of mass destruction programs had been incapacitated, largely as a result of the
coalition bombing of Iraq's nuclear facilities during Desert Storm.
The Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI
(Director of Central Intelligence) on Iraq's WMD, also known as
the Duelfer Report, which was first released in September 2004, came to the
conclusion that Iraq's ability to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program was
severely constrained after 1991 and found no signs of Netanyahu's "washing machine centrifuges". The Duelfer Report also notes that, in
large part, Saddam's motivation to achieve nuclear weapons capabilities was driven
by his view of Iran and its Persian population as an existential threat to
Iraq, particularly in the later days of the Iran-Iraq War. Since Iran was
developing weapons of mass destruction, Saddam felt a need to keep up with his
neighbours. The wish to balance Iraq against the power of Israel was
secondary to Iraq's need to protect itself from Iran.
Let's go back to the present. When Knesset Speaker
Yuli-Yoel Edelstein received the "Warrior for Truth Award" from
Algemeiner in February 2015, he stated
that:
"We better act now because the truth is that Iran is
getting dangerously close to [having] nuclear weapons..."
Here is his speech
in its entirety (his quote on Iran can be found at 10:25):
It is interesting to see
that Israeli leaders have a significant fixation with the potential nuclear
capabilities of its Middle East neighbours, even though history has proven
Israel's leadership (and by association, its intelligence network) completely wrong about Iraq's nuclear threat. This is
particularly compelling given that, according to an excerpt from a secret U.S.
Defence Intelligence Agency report from 1999, Israel had between 60
and 80 nuclear weapons in 1999. It is important to note that Israel is
extremely secretive about its nuclear weapons capability and that actual
numbers of Israel's nuclear weapons range widely, with estimates by the Arms Control
Association projecting that Israel has between 80 and 100 nuclear warheads and
fissile material sufficient to create an additional 200 weapons.
The Trump Administration must be extremely careful that it does not let Israel drive its agenda toward Iran and the dismantling of its possible nuclear capability. It should also be very cautious about Israel's approach to its Arab neighbours.
The DIA's estimate was 82 nuclear devices. Former Dimona nuclear worker Mordecai Vanunu claims 200 such devices. The Reverend John Steinbach claimed 5 t 600 such devices.
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