Dr. Nouriel Roubini is a professor of
economics at New York University Stern School of Business. He served as a
senior economist for international affairs on the White House Council of
Economic Advisors. Dr. Roubini is renowned for his September 7, 2006 speech before a crowd of economists
at the International Monetary Fund where he warned that the United States was
likely to face a housing crash and a deep recession as shown in this excerpt:
"I argue that housing today, like the tech bust in
2000-2001 will have a macro effect; it is not going to be just a sectoral
effect. I argue that U.S. consumers are now close to a ‘tipping over’ point
given all the vulnerabilities I have discussed. I argue that the Fed easing
will occur, so the next move is going to be a cut, but it is not going to
prevent a recession. And, finally, I argue that the rest of the world is not
going to be able to decouple from the U.S. even if it is not going to
experience an outright recession like the United States. So on that cheerful
note, I will stop."
In his
latest missive, Dr. Robin discusses the emerging liquidity paradox that
has appeared in the economy since the Federal Reserve and other central banks
have been using unconventional monetary policies to solve the world's economic
ills since 2008. These policies have pushed up the size of the monetary base as
shown on this chart:
At $3.951
trillion, the monetary base is now 467 percent larger than it was just as the
Great Recession took hold at the end of 2007. This means that the U.S.
economy is flush with liquidity, thanks to the Federal Reserve's "printing
presses". All of this money has ended up lifting asset prices,
including bonds of both the private and public sector, stocks and housing among
others. Asset prices, in some cases, are now decoupled from realistic
valuations, particularly in the bond market where some bonds are now trading
with negative (or near zero) yields.
Dr. Roubini
goes on to note the two relatively recent bond market "hiccoughs",
the first of which is shown on this chart:
As soon as
Ben Bernanke telegraphed that the Fed would begin to taper its purchases of
long-term securities in the spring of 2013, interest rates shot up by nearly
100 basis points in a very short period of time. This event is known as the "Taper Tantrum". In fact, as shown on this graphic, the main part of the Taper Tantrum took place over a very, very short period of time:
Again, on October 15, 2014, U.S. Treasury yields plunged
by 34 basis points (7 to 8 standard deviations) in a matter of minutes, an
event that should have occurred only once in three billion years according
to statisticians. According to Nanex, liquidity evaporated in
Treasury futures, prices skyrocketed and yields plunged. Here is a quote from Wall Street on Parade:
"One of the key concerns
floating around Wall Street is that the Federal Reserve itself may be a source
of liquidity stresses in the Treasury market place. As a result of its
previous, massive Quantitative Easing (QE) programs, it’s sitting with $2.4
trillion in Treasury securities on its balance sheet as of its report dated April 2, 2015. Keeping
that supply out of the marketplace is part of the Fed’s monetary policy
strategy to keep interest rates low and boost economic activity. However, in
times of stress when trillion dollar banks and billion dollar hedge funds want
to instantly flip out of junk bond ETFs, stocks and other riskier assets and
into the safe haven of U.S. Treasuries, there may not be enough supply to go
around given the trillions of dollars in high risk assets that now dominate the
globe."
Dr. Roubini observes
that one of the differences between the world's equity and fixed income markets
is that bonds of all types are not traded on exchanges that are as liquid
as stock exchanges. Most bond trades take place over-the-counter in
markets that are relatively illiquid. Many of these bonds are held in funds that
allow investors to divest of their positions at any time. This means
that banks which offer these funds containing these illiquid bond assets may be
forced to sell at a moment's notice (i.e. on demand); the need to sell the illiquid assets into
an illiquid market could push prices down very, very quickly. In other
words, there is a significant liquidity mismatch in the Treasury market that could cost fixed income
investors dearly. The events of both the spring of 2013 and October 15,
2014 give us a sense of just how painful that lesson could be to investors.
Dr Roubini concludes with
the following:
"This combination of
macro liquidity and market illiquidity is a time bomb. So far, it has led only
to volatile flash crashes and sudden changes in bond yields and stock prices. But,
over time, the longer central banks create liquidity to suppress short-run
volatility, the more they will feed price bubbles in equity, bond, and other
asset markets. As more investors pile into overvalued, increasingly illiquid
assets – such as bonds – the risk of a long-term crash increases.
This is the paradoxical
result of the policy response to the financial crisis. Macro liquidity is
feeding booms and bubbles; but market illiquidity will eventually trigger a
bust and collapse." (my bold)
The liquidity mismatch issue is
yet another unintended consequence of the Federal Reserve's six year experiment
with a series of unproven monetary policies. This one could prove to be
just as painful to investors as the stock market readjustment in 2008 - 2009.
The value of bonds is based on long-term predictions of government deficits and inflation.These forecast are often formed using assumptions based on rosy scenarios and politically skewed to benefit those in power. Like many investors I think the bond market is a bubble ready to pop and won't touch bonds with a ten foot pole. Knowing what we know about the effect that interest rates have on the value of bonds one might deduce that the 30 year bull run on bonds will have to come to an end the moment rates are expected to go up.
ReplyDeleteTo give you a sense of what this may mean to U.S. Treasury Bond investors a 10 year treasury bond issued at a 2.82% interest rate could see a 42% loss in value from a mere 3% rise in interest rates. This means if you hold $100,000 in these bonds after this 3% increase in rates, you would only be able to sell those bonds for $58,000 in the secondary market. Not only would bond holders be stripped of wealth if rates rise or even worse soar, but the higher rates would magnify the nations debt service and rapidly impact our deficit in a negative way. The article below explores just how big a problem this path could cause.
http://brucewilds.blogspot.com/2014/12/bond-market-bubble-has-ugly.html