In a
fascinating look back in time, recently released documents on the National
Security Archives website show what plans the United States and its key ally in
the Middle East at the time, the United Kingdom, had for Iran and other oil
producing nations in the region. The Top Secret National
Security Council NSC 26 Report dated August 19, 1948, provides us with
a plan of action should the Soviet Union make aggressive moves into the Middle
East. With the Middle East currently on "high alert", the information in this posting seemed, to me, to be particularly pertinent.
NSC 26 also known as
"Demolition and Abandonment of Oil Facilities and Fields in the Middle
East" was collaborative effort by the National Security Agency, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the State-Army-Navy-Airforce Coordinating
Committee or SANACC and the State Department and became part of what was known
as the "denial policy".
Here is the cover letter from the
report:
The report examined the
implications of a "determined attack" by the USSR on the Middle East
region. This attack would have resulted in a Soviet takeover of all of
the Middle East's oil production facilities, a move which would have meant that
the USSR would have been able to use the oil and associated refined products to
fuel its military machine.
In the Analysis section of the
report, it is noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that, at the time
of the analysis, the United States and its allies would not be able to protect
Middle Eastern oil against an attack by the USSR and that, to deny the Soviets
of Middle East oil reserves, they would have to destroy surface installations
including refineries, loading, storage and transportation facilities as well as
plugging and abandoning all oil wells. The analysis suggests the
following:
1.) surface oil facilities could be
effectively destroyed within a few hours
2.) plugging and abandoning wells
would require from 30 to 60 days provided that the necessary personnel and
equipment was available. While this would render the wells unproducible
in the future, the oil and natural gas reserves would remain intact and be
available for later production.
NSC 26 Report goes on to note that
it will be necessary to stockpile demolition material and plugging equipment in
the oil producing areas as well as organizing and training crews and assigning
responsibilities for issuing the orders to proceed with both demolition and
abandonment. Here is a quote:
"Such plans and preparations
would at relatively little cost give the United States the capability under
favourable conditions of denying Middle Eastern oil to the enemy and of making
more difficult damage or destruction of the oil reserves. This capability
need be exercised only as a last resort, after it is determined that there is
no reasonable probability of keeping any particular field out of the possession
of the enemy."
The nations included in this plan
are as follows:
1.) British-owned refinery and fields
in Iran
2.) American-owned refineries and
fields in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
3.) Joint US - UK-owned field in
Kuwait
4.) Joint US-French owned fields in
Iraq and Qatar
It was determined that the U.S.
Secretary of State "should exercise general control over abandonment and
demolition plans and preparations and should be responsible for issuing the
orders to execute such plans."
Of course, as with any foreign
policy action, there are downsides as shown on page 3 of NSC 26:
It was noted that "if it
becomes necessary to implement these programs affecting a primary economic
resource of a friendly sovereign country, due
consideration must be given to minimizing unfavourable political and economic
consequences" (my bold) - to the
United States, of course!
Here are the conclusions of NSC 26:
As an aside, the U.S. Secretary of
State would disclose the denial policy's existence at his/her discretion.
Saudi Arabia was not informed in both 1952 and 1956 since the United
States expected a negative reaction.
Given the British responsibility
for the foreign relations of Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar and its involvement in
Iran's oil industry, let's take a quick look at the minutes
of a meeting on Oil Denial
that took place on April 30 and May 1, 1951 with the U.S. State Department:
Under Plan NECKPIECE (aka
SMARTWEED), the main objectives of the British were as follows:
1.) deny Russia from accessing
refined oil products that would allow them to transport their troops from
Russia, through Persia (Iran) and Iraq to Egypt
2.) to prevent the Russians from
obtaining machinery for export and use in their own country
3.) to prevent the Russians from
obtaining aviation fuel and other products for use in their own country and
elsewhere
Most ironically, one of the main
British oil denial objectives was to "prevent them (the Russians)
from ultimately denying the oil fields to the world".
By 1955, the U.K. Chiefs of
Staff/Joint Planning Staff had altered their oil denial plans as we can see
here on this
document from the minutes of
a meeting held on December 13, 1955:
Since the oil companies in the
Middle East were hiring an "increasing number of local workers in
responsible positions", it was seen as unlikely that they would co-operate
with the United States or the United Kingdom in their plans to destroy oil
infrastructure. As such, the "increased Allied nuclear
capability would be used to hold the Russians in the Zagros Mountains of
northern Iran and attacking their lines of communication with nuclear
weapons". Should that line of defense fail to hold back the
"Red hordes", the Allies could use the following method to deny oil:
In looking through these historical
documents, one has to wonder exactly what plans NATO and, in particular, the
United States have for denying the world's largest oil reserves to the non-oil
producing nations like China, given that Russia has massive reserves of both
oil and natural gas. We can be assured that the "Allies" are
more than willing to see key parts of the world's oil infrastructure utterly
destroyed if it means that certain regimes cannot access much needed hydrocarbons.
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