A joint Cato Institute - Johns
Hopkins project by Professor Steve Hanke, the Troubled Currencies Project, examines the role
of conflict, economic sanctions and political mismanagement on five of the
world's currencies, that of Argentina, Egypt, North Korea, Syria and
Venezuela. The issues facing these five nations have resulted in higher
rates of inflation, often much higher than officially reported inflation rates
that are used to placate the local population. To address this
inaccuracy, Professor Hanke collects black market exchange rate data and from
that, is able to estimate the implied or real world inflation rate that the
local civilian population experiences. In this posting, I will look at
his research on Egypt, a subject that is of particular interest now that Egypt
has passed the third anniversary of its 2011 uprising.
Here is a graph showing the fall in
the value of the Egyptian pound since December 2011:
As shown on the orange line, in
December 2011, the official exchange rate was just over 6 Egyptian
pounds to 1 United States dollar. In late 2012, the value of the pound
began to drop, hitting a low of 7 pounds to the dollar by May 2013 the rising
slightly to 6.9 pounds to the U.S. dollar and falling back to its current level
of 6.96 pounds to the U.S. dollar.
You will notice that the real world
exchange rate is substantially different than the black market exchange rate as shown on the blue line. Egypt's
currency black market began to develop in late 2012; by March 2013, the black
market exchange rate had fallen to 8.25 pounds to the U.S. dollar. By
mid-2013, the official exchange rate was relatively close to the official
exchange rate with a difference of roughly one quarter of a pound. Since
October 2013, the black market exchange rate has dropped to roughly 7.5 pounds
to the U.S. dollar and the spread between the official rate and the black
market rate has widened to half a pound.
Here is a graph showing Egypt's
official inflation rate and its implied inflation rate, calculated by Professor
Hanke using the black market exchange rate data:
Over the period from January 2013 to
December 2013, the official inflation rate rose from 6 percent to a high of
12.97 percent in November 2013. In contrast, as shown on the blue line,
the implied inflation rate hit a high of 35 percent in March 2013, dropping back
to its current level of between 15 and 20 percent, still very high by Western
standards. For most of the year, the inflation rate has been at or above 19 percent.
The Central Bank
of Egypt reports that headline inflation in December 2013 was 11.66
percent with core inflation at 11.91 percent (core inflation strips out
subsidized goods and volatile items including fruits and vegetables).
Headline inflation dropped from 12.97 percent in November and core inflation
dropped very slightly from 11.95 percent in November. In contrast to most
central banks, despite elevated levels of inflation, since President Mubarak
was deposed in July 2013, the Central Bank of Egypt has cut its discount
interest rates three times by a total of 150 basis points to its current level
of 8.75 percent, stating that it was more
concerned about boosting economic growth than it was about battling inflation.
What is of some concern is that the year-over-year price index for
fruits and vegetables rose by 28.3 percent in November 2013 and 20.5 percent
in December 2013. This could prove to be problematic for the new military
government since there are likely to be social repercussions if inflation for
necessities continues to run at these high levels, a scenario that is
increasingly likely now that the Central Bank of Egypt has lowered interest
rates. Additionally, the Egyptian economic growth level has fallen to
1.04 percent in 2013/2014 Q1 from an already "feeble growth rate" of
2.1 percent recorded in 2012/2013. That is also unlikely to make a
restive population happy.
From what we can see, it certainly
appears that Egypt's new military junta has its work cut out for it when it
comes to keeping Egypt's civilian population happy. Should the Central
Bank of Egypt's interest-rate cutting program backfire, it may not just be very
uncomfortable levels of inflation that are reignited. As shown on this graph, a very high percentage of Egyptian households experienced food price shocks after the revolution, a situation that has led to household rationing and dietary changes:
With an average Egyptian family spending 40.6 percent of their income on food and 48.9 percent of the population living below or just slightly above the poverty line, the potential shock of higher food prices could prove critical to a peaceful resolution of the current crisis.
No comments:
Post a Comment