How Russians View Americans

Since the later part of 2016, an evolving and growing anti-Russia sentiment has taken over the narrative in the United States with many in America (and much of the West for that matter) getting a sense that a dictatorship has overtaken the nascent democratic changes in the former Soviet Union that first appeared with Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness).  What those of us who live in the West rarely hear discussed is how Russian society views the United States.  A recent survey by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs in affiliation with the Levada Analytical Center in Moscow looks at several key issues, comparing the current state of Russians' opinion on the United States to the current state of Americans' opinion on Russia  and how these opinions have morphed over the past year.

Let's start with this question:

"Do you think that US-Russian relations will change/have changed after the election of President Donald Trump and, if so, in what way?"

The question was asked in both January 2017 and December 2017

Here are the results from January 2017, just as Donald Trump took office:

Improve significantly/somewhat - 46 percent

Haven't changed - 29 percent

Worsen somewhat/significantly - 10 percent

Here are the results from December 2017 after Donald Trump had been in office for nearly a year:

Improve significantly/somewhat - 14 percent

Haven't changed - 51 percent

Worsen somewhat/significantly - 28 percent

It is quite apparently that the optimism shown by Russians at the beginning of the Trump White House have been dashed with a nearly tripling of the percentage of Russians who feel that relations between the two nations have worsened somewhat or worsened significantly.

Here is a graphic showing the percentage of Russians that have a favourable viewpoint of the United States and how it has changed over the past three decades:

As you can see, since the end of the Cold War, Russians' antipathy towards the United States has rarely been higher.  When asked a question about whether Russia has enemies, 66 percent of Russian respondents believed that Russia has enemies with 53 percent of those giving the United States first mention as an enemy which works out to 35 percent of the overall Russian public.  By way of comparison, in June 2017 found that 52 percent of Americans defined Russia as an adversary, up from 46 percent in January 2017.  Oddly enough, only 35 percent of Russians describe U.S. power and influence as a critical threat to Russia with only 24 percent viewing NATO as a critical threat.

With the allegations of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, let's look at how Russians feel about America's influence on Russia's domestic affairs and international power as shown in this question:

"To what extent do you think that the United States tries to influence domestic affairs in Russia?"

A great deal - 36 percent

A fair amount - 43 percent

When Americans are asked the same question, here is their response:

A great deal - 13 percent

A fair amount - 42 percent

In contrast, only 31 percent of Russians believe that their own nation tries to influence domestic affairs in the United States.  This compares to 69 percent of Americans who believe that Russia tries to influence the domestic affairs of the United States with 74 percent believing that Russia is actively working to undermine American influence and power.

When asked if the United States is trying to influence Russia's domestic affairs, 78 percent of Russians agree and when asked if the United States is trying to undermine Russia's international influence and power, 81 percent of Russians agree. 

Lastly, with the evolution of the unipolar global power structure, let's look at how Russians and Americans look at Russia's role in the world:

As you can see, a very significant percentage of respondents from both Russia and the United States believe that Russia is playing a more important role in global geopolitics than it did ten years ago with a relatively small minority of Russians and Americans believing that Russia is playing a less important role today than it did ten years ago.  Interestingly, 47 percent of Americans think that the United States is less important on the global stage with only 22 percent believing that America is more important today than it was a decade ago. 

This fascinating analysis gives us an interesting snapshot of the Russian viewpoint of the United States.  It is apparent that any hope of improving relations between the two nations after the election of what appeared to be a relatively pro-Putin Donald Trump have evaporated, thanks, in large part, to the anti-Russia narrative proposed by Washington and propagated by the mainstream media.

NATO's Failure and the Baltic Front Line in the Cold War Part II

A leaked internal document from NATO looks at the alliance's ability to protect eastern Europe from an attack by Russia and provides us with a glimpse of the weakness of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to protect its own.  Here are some of the more interesting observations from the RAND report entitled "Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank - Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics". 

According to the report, the new front along the borders of the former Soviet republics of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia will prove to be the most likely target for Russian expansionism, expansionism that will require the intervention of NATO as part of its "collective defence" mandate (Article V) since Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia became members in 2004 after they gained their independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The RAND report opens by looking at a bit of history.  After the end of the Second World War and during the Cold War, NATO positioned eight Allied corps along the border between West Germany and its neighbouring Warsaw Pact neighbours with 20 divisions stationed to defend that frontier as shown on this map:

In addition, many more divisions were slated to flow into the West German frontier as hostilities escalated.  As you can see on the map, that potential frontline has moved to the aforementioned three Baltic States.  Currently, these three states are defended by the indigenous forces of each nation with a total size of a light infantry brigade each meaning that they are highly unlikely to be able to defend themselves.

By way of comparison, the Russian army can muster 22 battalions for operations in its Western Military District, about the same number of divisions that it had in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact nations in the early 1990s. 

One key part of the problem for NATO is that of geographic distance.  From the Russian border to Tallin (the capital of Estonia), the highway distance is only 200 kilometres and the distance to Riga (the capital of Latvia), the highway distance is roughly 210 kilometres (depending on the route taken).  Access could also take place through Kaliningrad, the small part of Russia nestled between Poland and Lithuania.  

Geographically, the area is very complex.  The terrain is composed of large open areas divided by forested regions, lakes and wetlands, a combination that makes access by wheeled vehicles difficult.  As well, there are few large rivers that would form defensive lines and act as barriers to troop movements.   

  

RAND conducted a series of war-games between the summer of 2014 and the spring of 2015 looking at the shape and outcome of a near-term Russian invasion of the three Baltic states.  On the Russian side, the games employed 27 battalions of Russian forces from the Western Military District and Kaliningrad, moving to occupy Estonia, Latvia or both and measured the ability of NATO to protect its Baltic member states.  The scenario assumed a one week warning period which allowed NATO to move light infantry units into the region by air as shown on this table:

The Russian forces main attack force headed for Riga and a secondary attack secured the ethnic Russian areas of Estonia and then proceeded towards Tallinn as shown on this map:

In this scenario, according to the RAND analysis, the NATO forces were clearly inadequate and were incapable of mounting a forward defensive position.  Rather than pushing Russian forces back, multiple plays of the game showed that Russian forces eliminated or bypassed all of NATO's resistance and were able to enter Riga and Tallinn between 36 and 60 hours after the beginning of hostilities.

Three factors contributed to the failure of NATO:

1.) Despite the fact that NATO's 12 maneuver battalions are not significantly outweighed by Russia's 22 when looking at sheer numbers, the problem exists with the fact that seven of NATO's battalions are those of Estonia and Latvia which are poorly equipped for fighting against an armoured Russian battalion.  In contrast, all of Russia's forces are motorized, mechanized or tank units and their eight airborne battalions are equipped with light armoured vehicles.

2.) Russia has an advantage in tactical and operational firepower and possesses ten artillery battalions, three of which are equipped with tube artillery.  In the battle scenario, Russia forces prevent NATO's infantry from retreating and were able to destroy them in place.

3.) There were inadequate NATO ground forces in the region to slow or halt the momentum of the Russian attack.  Even with a substantial toll taken by NATO's airpower in the region, NATO's air forces had multiple jobs to do (i.e. suppressing modern surface-to-air defences, defending against possible air attacks on NATO forces) and had its ability to impact the outcome of the ground war limited.

According to RAND's analysis, the only way to mitigate a Baltic disaster is to make investments in NATO that will form part of a more-robust deterrent.  This would include the additional of three brand-new Armoured Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs) to the U.S. Army at a cost of roughly $13 billion (or less, depending on the use of Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles that are currently in storage) plus an annual opening cost of roughly $2.7 billion.  

Let's close this posting with the final paragraph of the report which nicely sums up the Baltic situation:

"Taking measured steps to bolster NATO’s defensive posture in the Baltic states is not committing the United States and Europe to a new Cold War and does not signal irreversible hostility toward Russia. It is instead due diligence that sends a message to Moscow of serious commitment and one of reassurance to all NATO members and to all U.S. allies and partners worldwide."

How Russia is Preparing for War

At the recent Sochi meeting between Vladimir Putin and his senior Defense Ministry officials, officials from Russia's defense industry as well as the heads of various ministries and regions, Mr. Putin made a series of very interesting comments about Russia's readiness for war following the Zapad-2017 military exercise that received relatively little coverage in the mainstream Western media.  While this lack of coverage is not terribly surprising given the anti-all things Russian sentiment that has taken root in the Western media since 2014, it is rather negligent given the importance of the comments and the fact that the world seems to be heading into the Cold War Part 2.

As background, between September 14 and 20, 2017, Russia conducted one of its largest military exercises since the end of the Cold War.  Zapad-2017 tested Russia's plans for a full-scale conflict with NATO with the drills taking place along the border between Belarus/Russia/Kalinigrad and the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.  Here is a map from the European Council on Foreign Relations showing the locations of the exercises:

    

Prior to the exercises, some Western analysts postulated that Zapad-2017 was a springboard for Russia to invade and occupy Lithuania, Poland and or Ukraine. 

According to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zapad-2017 involved the following:

Here is a video showing Vladimir Putin arriving at and observing the Zapad-2017 war games:

With that background, let's start with Mr. Putin's comment as released by the Kremlin regarding the state of Russia's military defences made on November 20, 2017 at the opening of the tenth cycle of meetings on military matters with senior officials of Russia's Defense Ministry and the nation's defense industry held in Sochi:

"The development of a new State Armament Programme is nearing completion. Its implementation will largely determine the combat capability of the service arms and branches for the coming decade and in the long run. We need to carefully check all our plans.

Our Army and Navy must possess the most advanced weapons, military and special equipment, which take into account, among other things, potential changes in the strategy and tactics of warfare in the future and are on a par or, better yet, superior to their foreign counterparts. If we want to be in front and win, we must be better.

The key indicators of the programme should, above all, ensure guaranteed strategic deterrence and, in the event of a potential external threat, its effective neutralisation.

Of course, the implementation of the State Armament Programme will depend on capabilities of defence enterprises, scientific and research centres. However, it is important not only to develop in a timely manner advanced technology or weapon samples that meet the requirements of the Defence Ministry, but also to be ready to launch them into mass production without any delays or disruptions." (my bold)

Here are additional comments made by Mr. Putin on November 21, 2017 at the Sochi series of meetings in which he focuses on the fulfillment of Russia's state defense order:

"As part of the fulfilled tasks, the armed forces have received over 3,400 items of advanced and upgraded hardware, including 16 combat vessels, 190 modern aircraft and helicopters, 800 tanks and armoured combat vehicles, 170 missile defence systems, and 1,950 multipurpose vehicles.

Defence industry experts have carried out regular maintenance of the main arms and equipment right in the field.

In general, these measures allow increasing the overall share of modern arms and equipment models at the armed forces’ disposal up to 60 percent by the end of this year.

Let me note that many arms samples were tested in action against terrorists in the Syrian Arab Republic. The tests in actual combat conditions confirmed the high quality of the Russian weapons. Their traditional advantages are simple operation and reliability.

A number of our international partners, including the new ones, have already shown interest in buying Russian arms and equipment and expanding military technical cooperation with Russia.

We have to closely study and use the practical experience of putting our armament systems to use. We also have to encourage positive tendencies in planning, placing and fulfilling the state defence order to make all elements of this interconnected system work effectively together." (my bold)

Now, lets look at Mr. Putin's final comments regarding the Zapad-2017 war games to his colleagues at the Sochi meetings on November 22, 2017:

"I propose that we discuss a key event on our training schedule, the Zapad-2017 strategic military exercise, primarily its civilian aspects as the exercise involved many civilian departments and regions.

Attending this meeting are the heads of ministries and the governors who contributed to the organisation of this exercise. I would like them to speak about their conclusions and proposals regarding the issues that occurred and the aspects that still need to be addressed.

It should be said that several important goals have been attained at the exercise. First, we checked our mobilisation readiness and ability to use local resources to meet the troops’ requirements. Reservists were called up for this exercise, and we also tested the ability of civilian companies to transfer their vehicles and equipment to the armed forces and provide technical protection to transport communications.

We also assessed the provision of transport and logistics services, as well as foods and medicines to the army. We need to review once again the defence companies’ ability to quickly increase output.

The exercise has exposed certain shortcomings. We must analyse them so as to propose additional measures to enhance mobilisation readiness.

I want to say that the economic ability to increase the production of defence products and services quickly is a vital element of military security. All strategic and simply large companies, regardless of the type of ownership, must be able to do this.

We held detailed discussions on this topic in 2015 and 2016. Instructions were issued to modernise production, to create a reserve of material and technical resources, and to ensure the transportation of military personnel. The ministries and agencies are working on this in close cooperation with the Defence Ministry under the guidance of the Board of the Military Industrial Commission. I would like you to make short reports on this work at our meeting today and to say which shortcomings of the past few years have been settled and which are still to be dealt with.

Let us talk about all of this in detail and draw conclusions for the future." (my bold)

To put all of this into perspective, Russia is the world's third largest spender when it comes to its military.  According to SIPRI, in 2016, the United States spent $611.12 billion (in 2015 U.S. dollars) on defense, China spent $215.18 billion and the Russian Federation spent $69.25 billion.  While Russia spends roughly one-ninth of what the United States spends on its military, it has the capability to produce materiel that should cause the United States to think twice before escalating tensions to the point of outright hostilities.  As we can see from Mr. Putin's comments, the Russian Federation is "in it to win it" in the event of an all-out war and is certainly preparing for this eventuality by modernizing its forces and preparing its civilian industries to convert to a war production footing.

On the upside, the military-industrial-intelligence complex in America will be very happy!