Stepping Closer to a War in the Middle East

Recent testimony on Capitol Hill by Daniel R. Coats, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) looked at the intelligence community's assessment of threats to the America's national security.  One of the focuses of this year's Worldwide Threat Assessment is Iran; in this posting, I want to pick out a few salient points that may help us gain a better understanding of what lies ahead in the Middle East as the war in Syria appears to be winding down, particularly given the recent attacks by Israel's Air Force against alleged Iranian military sites in Syria.  

In the 2019 edition of the Worldwide Threat Assessment, Iran is mentioned 72 times behind the 85 for China and 81 for Russia.  This compares to 32 for Syria, 27 for North Korea, 7 for Libya, 6 for Cuba and only 4 for Venezuela.  Let's focus on the threats from Iran with particular emphasis on the relationship between Iran, Syria and Israel:

A.) Cyberthreats:

"Iran continues to present a cyber espionage and attack threat. Iran uses increasingly sophisticated cyber techniques to conduct espionage; it is also attempting to deploy cyber attack capabilities that would enable attacks against critical infrastructure in the United States and allied countries. Tehran also uses social media platforms to target US and allied audiences, an issue discussed in the Online Influence Operations and Election Interference section of this report. 

1.) Iranian cyber actors are targeting US Government officials, government organizations, and companies to gain intelligence and position themselves for future cyber operations. 

2.) Iran has been preparing for cyber attacks against the United States and our allies. It is capable of causing localized, temporary disruptive effects—such as disrupting a large company’s corporate networks for days to weeks—similar to its data deletion attacks against dozens of Saudi governmental and private-sector networks in late 2016 and early 2017." 

B.) Weapons of Mass Destruction Development:

"We continue to assess that Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities we judge necessary to produce a nuclear device. However, Iranian officials have publicly threatened to reverse some of Iran’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) commitments—and resume nuclear activities that the JCPOA limits—if Iran does not gain the tangible trade and investment benefits it expected from the deal.

1.) In June 2018, Iranian officials started preparations, allowable under the JCPOA, to expand their capability to manufacture advanced centrifuges.

2.) Also in June 2018, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) announced its intent to resume producing natural uranium hexafluoride (UF6) and prepare the necessary infrastructure to expand its enrichment capacity within the limits of the JCPOA.

3.) Iran continues to work with other JCPOA participants—China, the European Union, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom—to find ways to salvage economic benefits from it. Iran’s continued implementation of the JCPOA has extended the amount of time Iran would need to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon from a few months to about one year.

Iran’s ballistic missile programs, which include the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the region, continue to pose a threat to countries across the Middle East. Iran’s work on a space launch vehicle (SLV)—including on its Simorgh—shortens the timeline to an ICBM because SLVs and ICBMs use similar technologies."

What the Threat Assessment fails to mention is that it would be highly unusual that Iran would use a space launch vehicle for an ICBM since it has a significant satellite program and wishes to become the “go-to” satellite launching nation for the Middle East.

The United States is also concerned that Iran is in non-compliance with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and that it may not have declared all of its chemical weapons capabilities.  That said, the authors of the report neglect to mention this:

C.) Regional Threats:  

This part of the report looks at the potential challengers to American hegemony and include Russia, China, North Korea and, of course, Iran.  Here's what the report has to say about the status of Iran's threats to American interests:

"Iran’s regional ambitions and improved military capabilities almost certainly will threaten US interests in the coming year, driven by Tehran’s perception of increasing US, Saudi, and Israeli hostility, as well as continuing border insecurity, and the influence of hardliners.

We assess that Iran will attempt to translate battlefield gains in Iraq and Syria into long-term political, security, social, and economic influence while continuing to press Saudi Arabia and the UAE by supporting the Huthis in Yemen.

In Iraq, Iran-supported Popular Mobilization Committee-affiliated Shia militias remain the primary threat to US personnel, and we expect that threat to increase as the threat ISIS poses to the militias recedes, Iraqi Government formation concludes, some Iran-backed groups call for the United States to withdraw, and tension between Iran and the United States grows. We continue to watch for signs that the regime might direct its proxies and partners in Iraq to attack US interests.

Iran’s efforts to consolidate its influence in Syria and arm Hizballah have prompted Israeli airstrikes as recently as January 2019 against Iranian positions within Syria and underscore our growing concern about the long-term trajectory of Iranian influence in the region and the risk that conflict will escalate.

Iran continues to pursue permanent military bases and economic deals in Syria and probably wants to maintain a network of Shia foreign fighters there despite Israeli attacks on Iranian positions in Syria.  We assess that Iran seeks to avoid a major armed conflict with Israel.However, Israeli strikes that result in Iranian casualties increase the likelihood of Iranian conventional retaliation against Israel, judging from Syrian-based Iranian forces’ firing of rockets into the Golan Heights in May 2018 following an Israeli attack the previous month on Iranians at Tiyas Airbase in Syria."  (my bolds)

Let's look at a little-reported statement from a Brigadier General Hossein Salami of Iran's Islamic Revolution Guards Corps from January 28, 2019 in reposes to Israel's repeated attacks against so-called Iranian installations in Syria:

"We announce that if Israel takes any step to start a new war, without a doubt, this war would be the same war, which would end in its elimination and the occupied territories will be retaken.  Whoever threatens to destroy us will bear the full responsibility."

...and, from this report from Iran's Tasnim News Agency, it looks like Iran will not be leaving Syria anytime soon:

...and, lastly, this interview with Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of the Lebanon's Hezbollah in which he warns Israel to be very careful in using its military to remove Iran from Syria and that Benjamin Netanyahu's bet on the fall of Bashar al Assad and Syria as a whole has been an abject failure:

Note this quote:

"At any moment a decision could be taken to deal differently with Israeli attacks on Syria."

You will also note that Nasrallah makes the rather interesting observation that Netanyahu has attacked Syria as a strategy to help him win the upcoming Israeli election.

While the U.S. intelligence community has many fears about Iran's growing influence in the Middle East and how it threatens American hegemony, one of Washington's bigger concerns should be Israel since Benjamin Netanyahu's pathological hatred for all things Iranian and the growing likelihood that he could find himself removed from office in the April 2019 election has created a man that is desperate for a "win" in Syria, a "win" that could well create the next Middle East war.  The American intelligence community's concerns about Iran's cyberthreats and its mothballed nuclear weapons program pale in comparison to the growing odds of an Israeli-created war in the region. 

Russia's Intelligence Network and How It Creates Paranoia in the West

There is little doubt that the West's views of Russia are among the most negative that the world has experienced since the end of the Cold War.  Russia is vilified for everything including the situation in Ukraine, the Skripal affair and meddling in the 2016 American election and is seen as a significant threat to America's hegemony.  A recent report entitled "Putin Sees and Hears It All - How Russia's Intelligence Agencies Menace the UK" from the United Kingdom-based Henry Jackson Society takes the anti-Russia paranoia to a new level.  The report is based on interviews with 16 high-level dissidents and defectors, Western business people and human rights activists, Russia-watchers and former Whitehall officials (aka British government officials) and outlines the "banal and brazen" examples of how Russia is openly interfering in the affairs of the United Kingdom and provides us with an assessment of the scale of Russian spying in the United Kingdom.

Let's open by looking at the three main Russian intelligence agencies that are covered in the report:

1.) FSB or Federal Security Service - this is the successor to the KGB and is subordinate to the President of Russia.  Estimated employees - 387,000.  The FSB focuses on political affairs in the UK, particularly organizations and individuals that are politically active, especially those that are anti-Putin. 

2.) GRU or Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff - is subordinate to the military command of Russia.  Estimated employees - 280,000 to 480,000.  The GRU focuses on military affairs in the UK.

3.) SVR or Foreign Intelligence Service - this is also a successor to the KGB and is subordinate to the President of Russia.  Estimated employees - 13,000.  The SVR focuses on traditional intelligence gathering from military, political and commercial sources in the UK.

Total employment in the Russian intelligence services is believed to range from 680,000 to 880,00 people compared to only 16,868 employees involved in intelligence and security services across the seven U.K. security agencies.  By way of comparison, here is a screen capture showing how many employees there are in the United States National Intelligence Program for fiscal year 2013:

The author of the report states that spending on Russia's security issues (i.e. defense and law and order) have tripled between 2008 and 2016, rising from 22.7 percent to 35 percent of the total federal budget as shown on this table:

The report opens by noting that two former Russian officers have been assassinated on British soil; Sergei Skripal (and his daughter, Yulia), a retired GRU officer and Alexander Litvinenko, a former FSB and KGB officer back in 2006.  Here is a quote from the report about the threat posed by Russia:

"Unlike for the countries of eastern and central Europe, the threat Russia poses to the UK is not primarily military – aside from Russia’s frequent probing of the UK’s air- and sea-space,  and the UK’s deployment of troops to the Baltic States and Poland as part of NATO measures to counter Russian aggression in the region. instead, the threat comes from Russia’s full spectrum approach to foreign policy in which, according to Russia’s 2015 Military Doctrine, “military force and political, economic, informational or other non-military measures” are integrated to achieve political goals."

The author also provides us with an explanation for why Russia's intelligence and security apparatus is so large and why it is so important to Russia and Vladimir Putin:

"Putin’s understanding of the post-cold War world is diametrically opposed to that of the West. Like most of Russia’s military and political elite, he sees periods of ‘peace’ not as opportunities to prosper and relax, but instead as opportunities to prepare for the next (inevitable) conflict. For at least a decade, the Kremlin has believed that Russia is engaged in a zero-sum conflict with the West and that it faces a serious, even existential, threat. The Kremlin also believes that the West took advantage of Russia in the 1990s when it was weak, and it is willing to go to extremes to ensure that this does not happen again. This ‘wartime mind-set’ was evident before 2014, but has become especially prominent since.

In Putin’s eyes, the US, as during the cold War, is Russia’s main strategic rival. Accordingly, many of Moscow’s defence and security resources are directed at Washington, D.C. This includes its intelligence agencies...

Other resources are directed at NATO and the European Union (EU) as well as collective security interests." (my bold)

A "zero sum conflict"?  Isn't it Washington that believes it can actually win in a nuclear exchange scenario?  As far as a Russian "wartime mindset", that certainly sounds like Washington, doesn't it?   

With this existential threat, let's take a look at the author's analysis of the number of Russians who are actively operating in the United Kingdom.  

1.) Case Officers:

During the Cold War, there were 39 Soviet case officers who managed spies in London in 1985, 25 from the KGB and 14 from the GRU.  This level remained constant until 2010 but began to rise, hitting an estimated 37 from the FSB and SVR and 14 from the GRU in 2013.  In the UK as a whole, it is estimated that there are as many as 200 case officers managing up to 500 Russian agents.

2.) Spies:

There are two main types of Russian spies operating in the United Kingdom:

a.) declared spies who officially work at the Russian Embassy occupying roles as attaches or secretaries.  

b.) undeclared spies who work in the Russia Embassy but who are not accredited as intelligence officers, taking roles in sections such as trade or culture.

There are currently 56 diplomats working in the Russian Embassy in Kensington with "around half" being engaged in either declared or undeclared intelligence work.  Additionally, there are also spies that use false identities, posing as British citizens.  There are also Russian nationals living in Britain using their real identities but with few links to Russia's security and intelligence services.  Lastly, there are Russians who are travelling to the UK for short-term stays, using either their own name or an alias.

Russian agents gather intelligence on prominent Russians, Westerners and Russia-watchers in the UK, gathering information on individuals who currently or previously occupied positions of power.   Here is a quote from the paper showing how Russia's spying tactics work:

"In attempting to gain such information, Russia’s agents employ a number of tactics, one of which follows a rather simple playbook.  A plausible scenario, described by a number of current and former government officials, is that a Whitehall official attends a high-level, closed-door event in the city. Attendees, as well as making polite conversation, exchange business cards, to the point where almost everybody has spoken with everybody else and most have exchanged business cards. When the Kremlin needs some information, one of the individuals who swapped cards with the official will reactivate the contact, seeking a meeting. When the two individuals meet, most likely at a café or bar, efforts to gather intelligence begin."

Here's where I think that the paper goes off the rails.  The author observes that there are an estimated 150,000 Russian expatriates currently living in London alone that form a potential source of intelligence gathering for Russia's three intelligence agencies.  According to the author's research, anywhere between one quarter and one half of Russia expats living in London's Russian community have been informants meaning that Russia has roughly 75,000 amateur spies living in London on top of its declared and undeclared Embassy workers and other Russian government organizations.

Here is a key paragraph that best explains today's environment:

"Many of the people interviewed for this paper described a growing belief that they are under close watch by Russia’s intelligence agencies. Whatever the truth, for the Kremlin this is a victory in itself – even if it does not lead to Moscow gaining information, making people paranoid means they start to question or change their behaviour. “Never say anything in private that you wouldn’t say in public. And never say anything in public that you wouldn’t want the Kremlin to hear”, was a recurring sentiment voiced by interviewees and interlocutors."

Yes indeed, we certainly do live in a time of paranoia, particularly when it comes to Russia.  It's a good thing that neither the United Kingdom nor the United States would ever think of intelligence gathering on this sort of scale....as long as you can forget about the massive snooping programs of the Five Eyes member states which includes both countries.

Creating a New Category of Enemy for America

Updated May 2018

The Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate recently passed S. 1761, the bill authorizing appropriations for fiscal 2018 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States government, the Community Management Account and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System.  While the passing of this bill received relatively little attention from the mainstream media, some of the so-called "fake news" outlets did pick up on one very salient point as you will see in this posting.

After reading through the mind-numbing legalese, right at the very bottom of bill we find the following rather innocuous section:

"SEC. 623. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON WIKILEAKS.      

It is the sense of Congress that WikiLeaks and the senior leadership of WikiLeaks resemble a non-state hostile intelligence  service often abetted by state actors and should be treated as such a  service by the United States"

The bill, which was sponsored by Richard Burr (R - North Carolina), the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, was introduced on August 18, 2017 and, according to Skopos Labs, has a 34 percent chance of being enacted, rather high odds when compared to much of the other business that passes through Congress.  In case you were wondering, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence consists of the following members:

Of the 14 members of the bipartisan Committee, only one voted against passage of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018.  Here is Senator Ron Wyden's (D-OR) explanation for his brave standalone vote:

"My concern is that the use of the novel phrase ‘non-state hostile intelligence service’ may have legal, constitutional, and policy implications, particularly should it be applied to journalists inquiring about secrets.  The language in the bill suggesting that the U.S. government has some unstated course of action against ‘non-state hostile intelligence services’ is equally troubling.  The damage done by WikiLeaks to the United States is clear.  But with any new challenge to our country, Congress ought not react in a manner that could have negative consequences, unforeseen or not, for our constitutional principles.  The introduction of vague, undefined new categories of enemies constitutes such an ill-considered reaction.” (my bold)

Now, let’s take a closer look at the phrase "Sense of Congress", a phrase that is not often heard in public.  According to a 2016 analysis by Christopher M. Davis, "Sense of" resolutions and provisions are defined as follows:

"One or both houses of Congress may formally express opinions about subjects of current national interest through freestanding simple or concurrent resolutions (called generically “sense of the House,” “sense of the Senate,” or “sense of the Congress” resolutions). These opinions expressing the views of one or both chambers may be included in other legislation upon introduction or subsequently added by amendment."

"Sense of" resolutions and provisions have content as follows:

""Sense of” resolutions and amendments expressing the sense of one or both houses of Congress have been offered on many subjects. An informal survey of “sense of” resolutions and amendments adopted during recent Congresses shows that many of them focused on foreign policy matters, particularly resolutions that express the sense of the Senate.  However, “sense of” proposals were forwarded on a wide range of other subjects, including stressing a particular domestic policy priority; recognizing a historic milestone, figure, or location; and calling for certain federal agencies or officials to take, or refrain from taking, a specified action.”

Although “sense of” proposals have no force in law, foreign governments pay close attention to them as evidence of shifts in U.S. foreign policy priorities. On domestic issues, agencies also monitor “sense of” provisions because they may serve as an early signal that Congress will alter statutory provisions if the informal nature of “sense of” provisions does not influence agency policy." (my bold)

In a handful of words, "Sense of Congress" proposals are not legally binding, however, these resolutions are used by Congress to get a president to take a specific action or to get a foreign government to alter its policies.  In this particular case, the Senate is using this "Sense of Congress" to force the president and Congress to declare WikiLeaks a hostile intelligence service that is aided by state actors (i.e. Russia, China, Iran and whomever else is in the U.S. crosshairs at any given moment) and treat it as all hostile intelligence services are treated by Washington.

Basically, with this recent move by the Senate, the United States is taking the first steps toward declaring WikiLeaks as a new, undefined type of enemy of America, an enemy that is an arm of unnamed state actors, most particularly, Russia.  By declaring the organization as a hostile intelligence agency, the United States could eventually take more aggressive moves against the leadership of WikiLeaks, anyone who shares information with WikiLeaks and, at some point in time, prosecute those who report on WikiLeaks "leaks", a possibility that may explain the U.S. mainstream media's reluctance to publish any information on WikiLeaks ongoing revelations about the CIA's snooping activities which you can find here.  What is most nefarious about this development is the fact that, unlike the United States government and the American media, WikiLeaks has a 100 percent accuracy record in the years that it has been publishing information, information that often exposes the soft, white and very toxic underbelly of Washington.