With China and the United
States at odds over North Korea, the South China Sea and Taiwan, I wanted to take a look at a
comparison of the military strength of both nations. This is particularly
pertinent given the following comment from the Global Times, a tabloid
newspaper that is owned by China's ruling Communist Party's official People's
Daily newspaper after the United States sailed through the South China Sea:
"Analysts
believe that recent US military activity is another example of how the US is
struggling to maintain the status quo while coping with the rise of China as a
global power. They urge the US to face up to the reality that China is becoming
a maritime power and that China's determination to protect its sovereignty
should not be underestimated....The US provocation has boosted the chance of
military confrontation between Beijing and Washington," Zhu
Feng, director of the Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea
Studies under Nanjing University, told the Global Times." (my bold)
A recent study by Rand Corporation does a very
neat job of comparing the military strength of the world's current sole
superpower and the world's up-and-coming superpower, China.
The study begins by noting that China's People's
Liberation Army (PLA) has transformed itself from a large but
technologically antiquated military force into a very capable, modern
and technologically advanced military. While it still lags the
United States in certain areas, China has done an amazing job of arming its
military with the latest technology. As well, China's close geographic
proximity to potential Asian theatres of war gives it an advantage over its
competitors. Rand's report analyzes the U.S. and Chinese military
capabilities in ten operational areas in four snapshot years; 1996, 2003, 2010
and projected to 2017. This gives us a sense of how the
military capabilities of both nations have changed over a two decade
period. The scorecards evaluate the capabilities of both militaries
in two potential scenarios:
1.) An invasion by
China into Taiwan.
2.) A South China Sea -
Spratly Islands campaign.
For the purposes of this
posting (i.e. to keep it to a reasonable length), I will not examine all
ten operational areas rather, I will focus on two aspects; ballistic missile
development and nuclear stability.
Let's look at spending
on the military by both nations starting with China. China's military
has evolved a great deal since the 1960s and 1970s when it
was designed to protect the nation's borders. After
"peace" was brought to the Korean Peninsula in 1953, China engaged in
confrontations with the United States, Taiwan, India, the Soviet Union and
Vietnam. With the death of Mao Zedong, China's Communist Party gradually
opened the nation's economy, giving China access to Western markets,
investment, technology and military assistance. Over the years between
1978 and 1996, China's spending on the military declined from a high of 4.6
percent of GDP in 1978 to 1.0 percent in 1996. After the third Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996 when
China conducted both military exercises and missile tests in the vicinity
of Taiwan Strait which were meant to signal China's displeasure at the
visit of Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui to the United States and to
intimidate Taiwan in the lead-up to Taiwan's 1996 presidential election,
China's defense budget began to grow very rapidly and China began to import
weaponry from the former Soviet Union. In 2015, China's official
defense budget was $142 billion, however, not all defence-related expenditures
are included in their official defense budget with estimates showing that
China's 2010 spending on defense was 45 percent higher than official
budgetary numbers. Over the years between 1996 and 2015, China's
annual real military spending growth averaged 11 percent annually
with a focus on capabilities to fight a conflict across the Taiwan Strait.
This works out to a 620 percent real increase in spending on the military
which has outstripped the growth in China's GDP.
Now, let's look at the
United States. In the case of the United States, military budget
increased rapidly after the attacks of 2001 and then declined in the years
between 2010 and 2015. The U.S. 2015 defense budget of $560 billion is 57
percent larger (adjusted for inflation) than the budget in 1996.
Most of this increase has gone to fund combat operations in the Middle
East. One advantage that the United States has over China is its
significant stockpile of materiel that is readily accessible for use.
For instance, the USAF's first purpose-built stealth aircraft, the F-117,
first operated in 1983. The PLA is just developing its own stealth
capabilities, recently testing four prototypes of the J-20 as well as the
J-31, however, neither has entered the production phase.
Now, let's look at two
key aspects of China's military development.
1.) Ballistic Missiles: China has the most
active ballistic missile program in the world. The Second Artillery, the
branch of the PLA that is responsible for both nuclear and conventional missiles
has come a long way since 1996. Back then, the Second Artillery had a
handful of DF-15 and DF-11 missiles with limited accuracy. By 2010, the
Second Artillery had roughly 350 to 400 DF-15 missiles and 700 to 750 DF-11
missiles, both new variants that have vastly increased accuracy (circular error
probable (CEP) of between five and ten metres compared to 300 metres in 1996).
Here is a table showing China's growing inventory of short-range (SRBM),
medium-range (MRBM), intermediate-range (IRBM) and cruise missiles along with
projections to 2017 estimating China's inventory of conventionally armed
missiles at that time:
Here is a series of maps
showing China's growing capability to threatened U.S. bases with its missiles:
Obviously, as the decades
have passed, more and more U.S. bases are in the crosshairs of the Second
Artillery. The only U.S. base in the Western Pacific that is not
currently threatened by China's conventional ballistic missiles is Andersen AFB
on Guam, however, it is in range of China's nuclear-armed DF-3 IRBM.
China has announced that it is developing a 4000 km range IRBM that is
conventionally armed which will enter service between 2016 and 2019.
The challenge facing the
United States in the Western Pacific is the fact that there are only two U.S.
airbases that are located within U.S. fighters unrefueled combat radius of the
Taiwan Strait (i.e. less than 1000 kilometres). China has 39 airbases
within 800 kilometres of Taipei, the capital of Taiwan. Here is a table
showing the U.S. airbases in the Western Pacific and the distance to the
nearest Chinese territory and the Taiwan Strait:
To summarize, if China
were to threaten Taiwan by neutralizing U.S. Air Force Bases in the Western
Pacific, China's advances in ballistic missile technology since 1996 will give
China the advantage over U.S. forces in the region by 2017. As well,
if a conflict over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea were to develop,
China's ability to neutralize U.S. bases in the region have been greatly
improved since 1996, putting China's capabilities on par with the United States
by 2017.
2.) Nuclear First Strike
Stability:
China conducted its first nuclear weapon test back in 1964 and
has maintained a force of fewer than 250 nuclear warheads since that time.
It has a much different attitude toward the efficacy of nuclear
weapons, preferring to use them to dissuade other states from
using nuclear weapons against China rather than using them as a first-strike
weapon. Given that, the authors of the report looked at China's
first-strike stability; the ability of both China and the United States to
absorb a first strike by the other side and still launch a second,
retaliatory strike. In general, states that cannot absorb a nuclear
first-strike tend to develop more nuclear weapons, hoping that
they have sufficient inventory to respond.
If we look back to 1996,
China had 19 strategic nuclear weapons that could target the United States'
nuclear assets, none of which were capable of a successful first strike
compared to the United States which had more than 7600 nuclear
warheads deployed across a wide range of delivery systems
including silos, submarines and manned bombers. The authors of the
report estimate that by 2017, China will have between 106 and 160 warheads and
the United States will have 2144 nuclear warheads, greatly
reduced because of the U.S. commitments to the START treaty..
China currently appears to store all of its nuclear warheads in
depots, separate from launchers during peacetime meaning that China is
more susceptible to a nuclear attack than the United States where nuclear
warheads and launchers are a single unit.
Here is a table showing
the projected nuclear balance in 2017:
The authors estimate that
in a "low case" where China has only 106 warheads, that they could
destroy 1146 American warheads and their delivery systems or 53 percent of the
U.S. total. In the "high case" where China has 160 warheads,
only 1156 American warheads would be destroyed, largely because the only
U.S. targets left to strike after attacking major nuclear-capable bomber
bases and ports are Minutemen III silos which only contain a single
nuclear warhead each. Even with the growth in China's nuclear capabilities,
the United States would still be able to destroy most Chinese targets, however,
the number of surviving Chinese nuclear weapons has increased from four in
1996 to six in 2003, thirteen in 2010 and between fifteen and twenty-seven in
2017. Not only have the number of surviving Chinese missiles
increased over time, so has their reliability. As well, by putting increasing
numbers of weapons on mobile platforms, China may be able to better
protect its nuclear assets from an outside attack.
Let's summarize the findings
of the entire report, comparing China's capabilities in 1996 to their
capabilities in 2017:
1.) China's PLA has made
major strides in its capabilities, particularly in ballistic missiles, fighter
aircraft and attack submarines.
2.) Chinese military
gains have not been uniform and some areas of improvement have been
matched by the United States.
3.) China's ability to
control a conflict beyond its geographic borders are improving.
4.) China has not caught
up to the United States in terms of its aggregate capabilities, however,
it is quite capable of dominating its immediate periphery (i.e. Taiwan and
the South China Sea).
Overall, the trends are
working against the United States when one compares the military capabilities
of China to U.S. military forces. One of the biggest problems
facing the United States military is the legacy of military
commitments that it has acquired around the world after more than two decades
of being the world's only superpower. In two of the most recent examples,
Iraq and Afghanistan, combined costs of $1.5 trillion through to the end
of 2014 have meant that the U.S. military has revamped itself as a
counterinsurgency force rather than a military that is capable of fighting
a conventional war, the most likely scenario should hostilities develop in
either Taiwan or the South China Sea.
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