A Critical Examination of America's Role in Syria

An article that, until recently, appeared in the online version of the February 2019 edition of France's Revue Defense Nationale, takes a very critical look at how the United States forces in Syria executed their battle strategy against the remaining ISIS forces in Syria and the final success of the battle.  Colonel Francois-Regis Legrier, a senior French officer who has been in charge of directed French artillery supporting Kurdish-led groups in Syria since October 2018.   Colonel Legrier claims that the United States-led coalition fighting against ISIS in the Battle of Hajin (near Syria's eastern border with Iraq) as shown on these maps (which show Syria to the north and east (pink and yellow) and Iraq to the south (grey) with the battle area located under the small blue bomb icon):

...had focussed on limiting risks to itself rather than decreasing the risks to civilians which has greatly increased the death toll among civilians and left the regions infrastructure severely damaged.  Let's look at a few details of Legrier's commentary on the Battle of Hajin which took place between September 2018 and January 2019, the last battle to destroy the Islamic State which, at one point in time, controlled significant areas of both Iraq and Syria.

In the Battle of Hajin, there were approximately 2000 Islamist fighters, mainly foreigners, located in a thirty kilometre by 10 kilometre stretch along the Euphrates River in Syrian Arab-Kurdish territory.  The area where military action took place is a V-shaped wedge of land located between the Euphrates River on the west and the Iraqi-Syrian border to the east.  There are several thousand civilians present in the northern part of the Hajin pocket located in a mainly rural area.  The Syrian regime and Iraqi militia control the West Bank of the Euphrates River and the area to the north of the city of Al-Qaim (in Iraq) is the firing position of the coalition forces.  The southern border is controlled by the Katiba Hesbollah, a small relatively well equipped Iran-affiliated militia.

The author notes that the features of the ground fighting Battle of Hajin were very similar to battles of the First World War with a front line between fighters and with territorial gains reflecting violent attacks and counterattacks by each side through the massive use of artillery.  The ground war was fought using a combination of saturation with explosive weapons and precision guided ammunition that was operational in all weather conditions.  Islamic forces responded using rockets and mortars at rates of up to 100 per day.    The coalition forces had supremacy in the air battle, using surveillance and intelligence to guide the use of its aerial bombardment strategy; over a six month period, several thousand bombs were dropped over a few dozen square kilometres, resulting in the destruction of the local infrastructure.

Colonel Legrier goes on to note that the United States subcontracted its duties to its proxies, most particularly the Syrian Democratic Forces who were delegated the responsibility of conducting ground operations, resulting in a loss of control of how the battle was fought.  This led to higher levels of infrastructure destruction including hospitals, mosques, schools and residential area and a much higher human toll.  Here is a quote from the Middle East Monitor about the human cost of the Battle of Hajin:

"Human rights groups have repeatedly criticised the US-led bombing campaign, which has resulted in the deaths of scores of civilians over the past six months; to date, some 700 civilians – over 250 of whom were children – have been killed, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Thousands of civilians have fled the area, with the Al-Houl refugee camp in north-eastern Syria currently hosting over 39,000 people, mainly women and children.

In October, some 54 people – including 12 children – were killed in a single strike on a mosque in the town of Al-Susah, near the Iraqi border. The US alleged that the mosque was being used as a base by Daesh operatives; some 22 militants were also killed in the blast. Despite being hit during the weekly Friday congregational prayer, a popular time for civilians, the military claimed it targeted the mosque when only fighters were present."

Here is what Legrier had to say about the results of the fighting:

"Has the enemy been reached in his morale and willingness to fight?  Obviously no.   He deployed an unshakable combativity to the end, taking advantage of periods of bad weather, preserving him from the air threat, to counter attack violently...."

The author notes that, once defeat became obvious, the Islamic fighters escaped to safe havens where they remain to continue the fight as an insurgency.

  

In his paper, Colonel Legrier made two very important observations:

1.) there is a limit to proxy warfare - ground troops must be engaged rather than just using Special Forces and the Air Force to actually win a war.

2.) there is a limit to the West's techno-centric approach to warfare (i.e. the war halts while there is weather that prevent aerial attacks).

He also notes that the West has gained a short-term political advantage by avoiding significant losses during the Battle of Hajin and by retaining relatively positive public opinion about the coalition's role in the Syrian war in general.  That said, he clearly states that the American refusal to engage on the ground or by using attack helicopters suffuses that they have cast doubt on their intentions to finish the war against the Islamic State and leave Syria quickly.

Let's look at what Legrier's conclusions, using Google Translate to translate his commentary from French to English:

"Yes, the Battle of Hajin was won, at least on the ground but by refusing ground engagement, we unnecessarily prolonged the conflict and thus contributed to increasing the number of casualties in the population. We have massively destroyed the infrastructure and given the population a disgusting image of what may be a Western-style liberation leaving behind the seeds of an imminent resurgence of a new adversary. We have in no way won the war for want of a realistic and persevering policy and an adequate strategy. How many Hajins will it take to understand that we are on the wrong track?"

As the example of Iraq has shown us, conventional military forces find it extremely difficult and costly to win a war against a well-situated and well-armed insurgency.  As well, the lengthy war in Iraq has shown us that it is very, very difficult to win the hearts and minds of civilians living in a war-torn area.

Despite Donald Trump's mid-December proclamation that the war against the Islamic State was victorious as shown here:

...one of the key coalition players on the ground suggests strongly that such is not the case, that there is no future strategy for the region and that there is no lasting win.

Let's close this posting with an update.  Colonel Legrier's public commentary and criticism of the events that took place during the Battle of Hajin resulted in his paper being removed from the online version of the Revue Defense Nationale and potential punishment from embarrassed French authorities who were about to announce the defeat of the Islamic State.  I guess it doesn't pay to criticize your allies in a war zone.

If you wish to read the paper in its entirety, you can use Google Translate on the documents found at these locations:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1vX-7LX8pem2dpEEZkvrR0d5HQR3CEXW4/view

http://www.defnat.com/images/ABO-PDF/2019%2002%20%28fevrier%20-%20817%29.pdf

Using the Islamic State to Counter Iran - The Israeli Solution

Updated October 2017

Before you start reading this posting, I must apologize for its length.  Since the subject has a lot of "moving parts", I wanted to be certain that I presented all of the background necessary to understand the importance of main focus of this posting, an article that appeared on a Middle East think-tank website that outlines Israel's position on the eradication of the Islamic State.

A relatively recent piece on the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA) by Professor Efriam Inbar provides us with a rather different viewpoint on the continued existence of the Islamic State.  Since most of us have not heard of BESA, it was founded in 1993 by Dr. Thomas Hecht, a Canadian Jewish community leader as an independent and non-partisan institute affiliated with the political science department at Bar-Ilan University in Ramat Gan, Israel.  Since its founding, it has been directed by the aforementioned Professor Efriam Inbar, an authority on the Arab-Israeli conflict and an expert on Israeli strategic doctrines, national security issues and nuclear matters.  Most interestingly, in 2009, BESA was chosen by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as the venue from which he would publicize his key diplomatic policies.  Now, let's look at the recent offering of Professor Efriam Inbar starting with the opening two paragraphs:

"US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter recently gathered defense ministers from allied nations to plan what officials hope will be the decisive stage in the campaign to eradicate the Islamic State (IS) organization. This is a strategic mistake.

IS, a radical Islamist group, has killed thousands of people since it declared an Islamic caliphate in June 2014, with the Syrian city of Raqqa as its de facto capital. It captured tremendous international attention by swiftly conquering large swaths of land and by releasing gruesome pictures of beheadings and other means of execution."

Let's look at a bit of background first.  Back in January 2016, Ashton Carter met with his counterpart, French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian in Paris and announced the following:

"ISIL is a cancer that’s threatening to spread. And like all cancers, you can’t cure the disease just by cutting out the tumor. You have to eliminate it wherever it has spread, and stop it from coming back."

He also stated the following:

"Any nation that cares about the safety of its people or the future of its civilization must know this: The United States and strong partners like France will continue to lead the fight, but there can be no free riders....Our campaign to deliver ISIL a lasting defeat, at its source and wherever it rears its head, is far from over. But the outcome is certain.  Our campaign will continue to adapt and build on our success, as ISIL’s territory decreases, its resources dwindle, and local, capable forces gain the capacity to not only win on the field of battle, but to lay the foundation for lasting security in the region, and a more secure future for the world.”

At a press conference held after the July 20, 2016 meeting with 30 leaders and defence ministers from around the globe, Mr. Carter stated the following:

"I want to begin by thanking all of my counterparts, all of the ministers of defense from all of the nations represented here today at another one of our full counter-ISIL meetings of defense ministers from the entire coalition.

This is something we've done and we're going to do periodically, and I thank them for joining us as we continue to rigorous evaluate, plan the next steps of and further accelerate our campaign to deliver ISIL a lasting defeat...

As I said earlier today, our coalition's military campaign plan has three objectives.  First, to destroy the ISIL parent tumor in Iraq and Syria.  That's necessary, but it's not sufficient.  As recent attacks remind us, ISIL safe havens threaten not only the lives of Iraqi and Syrian people, but also the security of our own citizens.

And the sooner we defeat ISIL in Iraq and Syria, the safer our countries will be.  

So our second objective is to combat ISIL's metastasizes everywhere they emerge around the world.  And third, and most important, to help protect our homelands."

When you combine the comments from both meetings, it is pretty clear that the American Secretary of Defense will be satisfied with nothing short of complete eradication of the Islamic State wherever it exists.

Now, let's go back to Professor Inbar's perspective on the issue, remembering that his organization is closely linked with the current Israeli Prime Minister:  

"But IS is primarily successful where there is a political void. Although the offensives in Syria and Iraq showed IS’s tactical capabilities, they were directed against failed states with weakened militaries. On occasions when the poorly trained IS troops have met well-organized opposition, even that of non-state entities like the Kurdish militias, the group’s performance has been less convincing. When greater military pressure was applied and Turkish support dwindled, IS went into retreat.

It is true that IS has ignited immense passion among many young and frustrated Muslims all over the world, and the caliphate idea holds great appeal among believers. But the relevant question is what can IS do, particularly in its current situation? The terrorist activities for which it recently took responsibility were perpetrated mostly by lone wolves who declared their allegiance to IS; they were not directed from Raqqa. On its own, IS is capable of only limited damage.

A weak IS is, counterintuitively, preferable to a destroyed IS. IS is a magnet for radicalized Muslims in countries throughout the world. These volunteers are easier targets to identify, saving intelligence work. They acquire destructive skills in the fields of Syria and Iraq that are of undoubted concern if they return home, but some of them acquire shaheed status while still away - a blessing for their home countries. If IS is fully defeated, more of these people are likely to come home and cause trouble.

Moreover, a weak and lingering IS could undermine the attraction of the caliphate idea. A dysfunctional and embattled political entity is more conducive to the disillusionment of Muslim adherents of a caliphate in our times than an IS destroyed by a mighty America-led coalition. The latter scenario perfectly fits the narrative of continuous and perfidious efforts on the part of the West to destroy Islam, which feeds radical Muslim hatred for everything the West stands for."

Let's get to the real goal of Professor Inbar's rather interesting logic of allowing a much-reduced Islamic State to continue to exist:

"The West yearns for stability, and holds out a naive hope that the military defeat of IS will be instrumental in reaching that goal. But stability is not a value in and of itself. It is desirable only if it serves our interests. The defeat of IS would encourage Iranian hegemony in the region, buttress Russia’s role, and prolong Assad’s tyranny. Tehran, Moscow, and Damascus do not share our democratic values and have little inclination to help America and the West.

Moreover, instability and crises sometimes contain portents of positive change. Unfortunately, the Obama administration fails to see that its main enemy is Iran. The Obama administration has inflated the threat from IS in order to legitimize Iran as a “responsible” actor that will, supposedly, fight IS in the Middle East. This was part of the Obama administration’s rationale for its nuclear deal with Iran and central to its “legacy,” which is likely to be ill-remembered." (my bold)

Let's go back to 2015.  Here's what Benjamin Netanyahu had to say about the nuclear deal with Iran:

In light of his concerns about a nuclear Iraq from July 2015, here is what he had to say as a private citizen about another so-called nuclear threat in the region to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on September 12, 2002:

Let's repeat what he said:

"There is no question whatsoever that Saddam is seeking and is working and is advancing towards the development of nuclear weapons – no question whatsoever and there is no question that once he acquires it, history shifts immediately."

Now, let's put all of this together.  The organization that Professor Inbar heads functions as the mouthpiece for Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the same man who used his power (as a civilian) to convince the United States that they had no choice but to eradicate Saddam Hussein because he represented the threat of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, directly conflicting with the Israeli role as the region's sole nuclear power.  As the coalition forces discovered during the Iraq war, Prime Minister Netanyahu was dead wrong about Saddam Hussein's nuclear program, however, his insistence on the removal of Saddam Hussein did have one unintended consequence, it led to the birth of the Islamic State.  Now, we have Benjamin Netanyahu insisting that the P5+1 nuclear deal with Iran is once again destabilizing the region, allowing Iran to develop its nuclear weapons and increase its control of the region.  To counterbalance Iran's influence, BESA, Netanyahu's "mouthpiece", is suggesting that ISIS be allowed to exist in a much reduced form.  BESA clearly states that the real enemy in the region is Iran, a fact that, in their opinion, seems beyond the comprehension of the Obama Administration, and that the unlikely total defeat of the Islamic State that is the goal of the Americans and their friends will lead to one thing; an increase Iran's hegemony in the region.

I find it fascinating to see that an Israeli think-tank would take the position that the Islamic State should be allowed to exist in a reduced form to provide a political balance against Iran, Israel's avowed enemy-of-the-day in the Middle East.  While I think that the odds of completely defeating the Islamic State are very small, I think that the logic of allowing a form of the Islamic State to continue to exist simply to counter Iran is an extremely self-centred viewpoint on the part of Israel.

The High Cost of War

While the conflict in Syria and the fight against the Islamic State has, for the most part, been relegated to the back pages of the mainstream media in North America, the battle continues unabated.  Despite the recent ceasefire, there is quite a bit of action as part of Operation Inherent Resolve that is costing American taxpayers significantly as you will see in this posting.

Thanks to the Department of Defense, we get relatively regular updates on the situation in the operations to counter the Islamic State.  It is important to keep in mind that American forces have aligned themselves with a wide spectrum of local militia groups (some which have dubious goals) in the region in the attempt to control the spread of the Islamic State since operations began on August 8, 2014.  As well, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Jordan, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are participating in the operations in Iraq and the same nations excluding Belgium but adding Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates are participating in the operations in Syria

First, here are the key operational statistics, current to September 20, 2016:

1.) Number of strikes by the United States-led coalition:

Syria - 5,251

Iraq - 9883

Total - 15,2134

2.) Number of Strikes by the United States:

Syria - 4,983

Iraq - 6,704

Total - 11,687

3.) Total number of sorties flow by the United States-led coalition:

Syria and Iraq - 111,410

Here is a summary of the targets damaged and destroyed up to May 31, 2016:

Here is a map showing the next operations planned for the anti-Islamic State campaign:

Now, let's get to the bottom line.  As of August 15, 2016, the total cost of operations for Operation Inherent Resolve is $9 billion for an average daily cost of $12.3 million over the 739 days of operations.  Here is a more detailed biweekly breakdown:

While the cost of Operation Inherent Resolve may not seem overly onerous given how expensive military operations are, we have to keep in mind that this operation is basically an extension of the Iraq war which started in March 2003.  A recent assessment by Neta Crawford at Boston University shows the following war-related spending in current dollars for each of the theatres of operations:

If you prefer, here is a graphical representation of the year-by-year spending on each major war zone:

Here is a table that shows total spending and future spending obligations related to the "Foreign War on Terror":

Let's close with the following graphic which shows the influence that the Defense industry has on Washington:

The defense industry is the tenth highest spender (almost tied with two other sectors) when it comes to getting Washington to see thing their way.

It's really no wonder that we find ourselves in a perpetual state of war.  While the cost of the current anti-Islamic State operations pale in comparison to what has already been spent getting rid of Saddam Hussein and the Taliban/al Qaeda, in large part, Operation Inherent Resolve has certainly been less than a resounding success when one looks at it in context of the terrorist attacks in Europe and the United States since 2014.