Showing posts with label military spending. Show all posts
Showing posts with label military spending. Show all posts

Monday, August 12, 2024

The 2024 United States National Defense Strategy - The High Cost of Rebuilding the American Military Machine

The Commission on the National Defense Strategy for the United States recently released its final report to Congress and the President of the United States (whoever they may be) and some of the conclusions are eye-opening.

 

Here is the cover page of the 2024 edition of the National Defense Strategy report:

 

The authors of the report found that, among the senior civilian and military leaders of the Department of Defense and other departments; congressional leaders from relevant committees; private sector representatives; former government officials; experts in the think tank, academic, and federally funded research and development centre communities; and foreign allies that they met with, there was "near-unanimous recognition of the significant challenges to U.S. national security and broad agreement on the need for substantial and wide-ranging change" and that the national security system was outdated, bureaucratic and too political to make the changes that are necessary to protect America's role as global "police force" quickly enough.  There is also a reliance on decades-old military equipment and a culture of risk avoidance that is handicapping the U.S. military's ability to maintain its current role in the current unipolar world that is under threat from two growing superpowers.

 

The report opens by observing that both China and Russia are the major powers that seek to undermine U.S. global interest and that, in many ways, China is outpacing the United States and has negated America's military advantage in the Western Pacific over the past two decades.  In both cases, the report states that military spending by the superpowers-in-waiting is rising;  in 2024, Russia is estimated to spend 35 percent of its federal budget or 7.1 percent of its GDP on national defense and China announced a 7.2 percent increase in its official defense spending bringing it to 1.6 percent of GDP (excluding very significant off-budget items).  This compares to roughly 3 percent or 12 percent of government spending for the United States.  As well, China and Russia's "no limits" partnership formed in February 2022 along with the joint military and economic partnership with Iran and North Korea presents a growing threat to U.S. interests.

  

The report goes on to note that all-out war with a peer or near peer would be devastating for several reasons:

 

1.) massive military and personnel costs which is problematic given that recent recruitment shortfalls have resulted in decreased size of the Army, Air Force and Navy. 

 

2.) risk of cyberattacks on America's critical infrastructure.

 

3.) global economic recession due to disruptions to supply chains, manufacturing and trade.

 

4.) denied access to critical minerals needed to run the American economy and build weapons systems.

 

5.) hold U.S. space assets at risk.

  

Here is a quote with my bolds:

 

"The U.S. public are largely unaware of the dangers the United States faces or the costs (financial and otherwise) required to adequately prepare. They do not appreciate the strength of China and its partnerships or the ramifications to daily life if a conflict were to erupt. They are not anticipating disruptions to their power, water, or access to all the goods on which they rely. They have not internalized the costs of the United States losing its position as a world superpower. A bipartisan “call to arms” is urgently needed so that the United States can make the major changes and significant investments now rather than wait for the next Pearl Harbor or 9/11. The support and resolve of the American public are indispensable."

 

The authors of the report recommend that the U.S. Joint Force be structured to simultaneously:

 

1.) defend the homeland, maintain strategic deterrence, prevent mass casualty terrorist attacks, maintain global posture, and respond to small-scale, short-duration crises.

 

2.) lead the effort, with meaningful allied contribution, to deter China from territorial aggression in the Western Pacific—and fight and win if needed

 

3.) lead NATO planning and force structure to deter and, if necessary, defeat Russian aggression

 

4.) sustain capabilities, along with U.S. partners in the Middle East, to defend against Iranian malign activities.

 

As I noted above, the authors have taken notice of the decreased ability of the U.S. military to recruit new personnel which you can clearly see on this graphic from RealClear Defense:

 


Here is another quote from the Commission's report that is rather sobering for young Americans (with my bold):

 

"Redoubled recruiting efforts, new incentives for service, and more flexible personnel systems are needed to offset a lack of propensity for and interest in military service among the eligible population. Military retention remains high, demonstrating that personnel in service largely choose to remain in uniform. The nation must also consider the possibility that future conflict could overwhelm the capacity of the active-duty force and should plan now to better prepare the reserve components and, potentially, a broader mobilization.  More broadly, we support calls for increased levels of public and civil service to help provide a renewed sense of engagement and patriotism among the American people."

 

Get ready for a full-fledged, Vietnam War-style draft which, as one might expect, will not impact the offspring of the ruling class.

 

Of course, the recommended solution to the problem is a greater level of funding.  According to the report, Department of Defense spending ranged from 4.9 percent to 16.9 percent of GDP during the Cold War as shown here:

 

 

Keep the 4.9 percent to 16.9 percent of GDP numbers in mind.  During the Cold War, it is important to remember that DoD spending relied on top personal marginal income tax rates of 70 percent and corporate tax rates averaging 50 percent.  As such, the Commission makes the following recommendations:

 

1.) DoD should immediately review all major systems against likely future needs, emphasizing battlefield utility and prioritizing agility, interoperability, and survivability.  DoD should invest more in cyber, space, and software, which have enabled warfighting for decades but are now central to conflict and have global reach.

 

2.) Congress should pass a supplemental appropriation immediately to begin a multiyear investment in the national security innovation and industrial base. Funding should support U.S. allies at war; expand industrial capacity, including infrastructure for shipbuilding and the ability to surge munitions production; increase and accelerate military construction to expand and harden facilities in Asia; secure access to critical minerals; and invest in a digital and industrial workforce.

 

3.) DoD should immediately begin making structural changes and prioritization adjustments to spend national security funds more effectively and more efficiently. DoD should address its recruitment challenges, rewrite regulations to speed defense procurement (and address cultural impediments and risk aversion), and shift the R&D paradigm to adopt technological innovation from outside the department for warfighting purposes. The U.S. government should review national security authorities for agencies other than DoD and look for ways to enable and facilitate information-sharing, coproduction, and export controls to better work with allies.

 

4.) Congress should revoke or override the caps in the 2023 Fiscal Responsibility Act that serve as the basis for the FY 2025 budget request.

  

a.) For FY 2025, real growth in defense and nondefense national security spending is needed and, at a bare minimum, should fall within the range recommended by the 2018 NDS Commission.  Increased spending should be allocated to emphasize near-term readiness demands to restore and reinforce deterrence.  


Here is a graphic showing the budgetary shortfall when compared to the 2018 NDS Commission:

 

b.) Given the severity of the threats, the FY 2027 and later budgets for all elements of national power will require spending that puts defense and other components of national security on a glide path to support efforts commensurate with the U.S. national effort seen during the Cold War.

 

c.) Larger amounts of defense spending should be accompanied by sufficient resources to build capacity at the departments of State, Commerce, and Treasury; intelligence, trade, and investment agencies; the U.S. Agency for International Development; and the Department of Homeland Security and focus these organizations on national security missions. The United States should continue to provide support to its allies, which it relies on to fight with (or for) it.

 

d.) The ballooning U.S. deficit (and I might add debt) also poses national security risks. 

  

And, here's the key to the last recommendation:  


"Therefore, increased security spending should be accompanied by additional taxes and reforms to entitlement spending."

  

In other words, U.S. taxpayers should get used to the idea of increased taxes and decreases in entitlement spending for things like Medicare/Medicaid and Social Security at the same time as the nation's military industrial intelligence complex sticks its snout in the seemingly endless trough of taxpayer dollars.


If we look at the budgets for America's military during the Cold War which ranged from 4.9 percent to 16.9 percent of GDP and use the same percentages with the current GDP of $28.63 trillion (current dollars), the Pentagon's budget would range from $1.403 trillion to $4.838 trillion.  This compares to Fiscal Year 2024 spending of $948.6 billion on defense, $1.2 trillion on Social Security and $1.2 trillion on Medicare.

  

In closing, you can bet that this list of individuals that testified at the National Defense Strategy Meetings certainly had an impact on the Commission's recommendations for a larger U.S. military:

 




 

When you ask the military and its insiders what they want, it's highly unlikely that they are going to say "a smaller military" or "peace", isn't it?  Another Cold War is a wet dream for these men and women not to mention the upper floor, corner office dwellers at the nation's defense contractors.


Friday, June 11, 2021

Global Military Spending in 2020

With Washington increasingly feeling pressure as the multipolar world evolves, the annual summary of global military spending by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is very pertinent to the evolution of the new global reality.

 

Let's start by looking at global military spending.  Here is a graphic which shows the world's total military spending in 2020 broken down by region:

 


In 2020, while the global economy shrank by 4.4 percent (October 2020 projection) thanks to government responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, military spending rose by 2.6 percent, hitting $1.981 trillion.  In terms of the global economy, military spending rose to an average of 2.4 percent of GDP in 2020, up from 2.2 percent in 2019, the largest year-over-year increase since the Great Recession in 2009.

 

Let's look at the highlights for the world's three superpowers:

 

1.) United States - In 2020, Washington's military spending reached an estimated $778 billion an increase of 4.4 percent on a year-over-year basis, the third year in a row of military spending increases.  This military spending accounts for 39 percent of global total military spending.

 

2.) China - In 2020, second-placed China's military spending reached an estimated $252 billion, an increase of 1.9 percent on a year-over-year basis and a 76 percent increase over the decade from 2011 to 2020 inclusive.  China's military spending has risen every year for the past 26 years, the longest consecutive increases by any nation in SIPRI's database.

  

3.) Russia - In 2020, fourth-placed Russia's military spending reached an estimated $61.7 billion, an increase of 2.5 percent on a year-over-year basis.  Russia's military spending rose for the second year in a row but was 6.6 percent lower than it initial military budget.

 

In case you were interested, at $72.9 billion, India's spending on its military in 2020 resulted in the world's second most populous nation occupying third place among all nations. 

 

Now, let's look at one key group's military spending:

 

4.) NATO - In 2020, military spending by 12 member nations of NATO rose by more than 2 percent of their GDP on a year-over-year basis compared to only 9 member nations in 2019.  The United Kingdom's spending rose by 2.9 percent to $59.2 billion (putting them into fifth place overall) and Germany's spending rose by 5.2 percent to 52.8 billion (putting them into 7th place overall).

 

In contrast to many nations, the 11 Middle Eastern nations for which SIPRI has data saw their spending decrease by 6.5 percent in 2020 when compared to 2019, totalling $143 billion.  Saudi Arabia's military spending fell by 10 percent, Kuwait's military spending fell by 5.9 percent and Bahrain cut its military spending by 9.8 percent.

 

It is rather interesting to see that, with relatively few exceptions among the world's most heavily armed nations, global military spending continued to rise even as nations were forced to spend trillions of dollars on their COVID-19 pandemic responses even as their economies shrank thanks to government-mandated economic shutdowns.  Apparently, the global military-industrial complex/human killing and maiming business still had a great year despite the economic pain that the citizens of the world experienced in 2020.


Monday, September 21, 2020

Assessing American Military Spending

While Main Street America was distracted with all things COVID, in June 2020, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) released its Defense Acquisition Annual Assessment to Congress.  In this report, the GAO looks at the investments that the Department of Defense plans to make as it acquires new major weapons systems including aircraft, ships, satellites and increased investments in information technology.  Given the ramping up of the Cold War Part II with Russia and China, it is interesting to see how much Washington is willing to spend on defending the homeland from what it sees as a multipolar threat.

 

Let's open this posting with a definition.  Major Defense Acquisition Programs or MDAPs are generally programs designated by the Secretary of Defense as such or that are estimated to require eventual total expenditure for research, development, test and evaluation of more than $480 million or for procurement of more than $2.79 billion in fiscal year 2014 constant dollars.

 

Now, let's look at the GAO assessment.  The assessment summarizes the costs and scheduling measures for 121 weapons and information technology programs as shown here:

 

 

The report notes that Major Defense Acquisition Programs which account for the vast majority of the combined portfolio of weapons and IT programs have stabilized non-quantity-related cost growth but that they continue to proceed with limited knowledge and inconsistent software development approaches and cybersecurity practises.

 

Here is a graphic showing the number and cost of Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) from 2008 to 2019 (in billions of 2020 dollars):

 


On a year-over-year basis, the Department of Defense has invested $44 billion more in funding to its 2019 MDAP portfolio, up significantly from the $19 billion increase between 2017 and 2018.  Between 2018 and 2019, total acquisition cost estimates for DoD's 85 current MDAPs grew by $64 billion  (a 4 percent increase) that was driven by decisions to increase quantities of some weapons systems including a doubling of the number of missiles it plans to acquire through the Air Force's Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile program.  Over the one year period, on average, deliverability schedules increased by just over one month (a one percent increase).  That said, it is key to note that since their initial or first cost estimates, these 85 MDAPs have accumulated over $628 billion in total cost growth (a 54 percent increase) and deliverability schedules increased by more than 2 years (a 29 percent increase).

 

Here is a table showing the cost changes to the DoD's 2019 portfolio of 85 MDAPs over the past year:

 


In total, portfolio acquisition costs have increased by $63.8 billion (a 3.7 percent increase) over the past year, in part due to quantity increases ($49.3 billion in total).  This includes increased procurement costs of $49.33 billion (a 3.5 percent increase) and increased research and development costs of $14.69 billion (a 4.6 percent increase).  Of the 85 MDAPs, nine programs increased their total costs by 25 percent, accounting for more than $43 billion in total increased costs.

 

Here is a table showing the MDAPs with the highest increases in cost from the first full estimate:

 



It is important to note that, in some cases, program inefficiencies have led the DoD to reduce quantities.  In the case of the Navy's DDG 1000 Zumwalt Class Destroyer, development cost growth led the Navy to reduced quantities from 32 ships to three ships which, in turn, pushed up the average per-unit procurement costs.  Here is a breakdown of the Zumwalt issues showing that the Navy still won't have operational testing of the lead ship until September 2021 and delivery of a ship with its combat system in place until September 2022:

 



Let's close with this quote from the analysis:

 

"Among MDAPs we surveyed, we found that programs continue to move forward without the benefit of knowledge at key acquisition points, while future MDAPs reported plans to modestly increase the implementation of knowledge practices. These practices are key because we have found a statistically significant correlation between implementation of certain knowledge-based practices and improved cost and schedule performance. We also found, among the MDAPs we surveyed, inconsistent implementation of leading software development approaches and cybersecurity practices. This included longer than expected delivery times for software and delays completing statute-based cybersecurity vulnerability evaluations."

 

The American defense industry would like to thank American taxpayers for their unfettered generosity, even during the COVID-19 era.

 

Tuesday, July 9, 2019

The Evolution of China's Military Doctrine and Strategy

As the world appears to becoming increasingly unipolar, a reality that does not sit well with Washington and its brand of American exceptionalism, it's not surprising that the recent Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) "China Military Power - Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win" provides a rather grim assessment of China's growing capabilities as a military world power in a world that has grown accustomed to America's unchallenged military superiority.

Here is a brief video from the DIA touting its abilities to provide insights into China's military:


This volume of the Military Power series provides insight into China's defense and military goals, strategy, plans and intentions and gives America's military leadership an idea of the military challenges that result from these aspects of Chinese society.

Let's start with this quote from the 2015 Chinese white paper "China's Military Strategy":

"At this new historical starting point, China’s armed forces will adapt themselves to new changes in the national security environment, firmly follow the goal of the Communist Party of China (CPC) to build a strong military for the new situation, implement the military strategic guideline of active defense in the new situation, accelerate the modernization of national defense and armed forces, resolutely safeguard China’s sovereignty, security and development interests, and provide a strong guarantee for achieving the national strategic goal of the “two centenaries” and for realizing the Chinese Dream of achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation."

The authors of the DIA's paper also note that since the end of the Second World War, American forces have found themselves in direct conflict with China twice; Chinese volunteer forces who fought in Korea and direct Chinese air and air defense support of North Vietnam.


China's spending on defense has grown substantially over the past decade and a half, averaging 10 percent (adjusted for inflation) annually between 2000 and 2016 and slowing to 5 to 7 percent over the past two years.  The official defense budget has remained relatively static at 1.3 percent of GDP over the past decade as shown on this graphic:



For comparison, here is a graphic showing how U.S. military spending as a percentage of GDP faro outweighs that of the next seven biggest military spending nations:



The authors note that China benefits from the "latecomer advantage"; China has not had to invest in the costly research and development of new technologies to the same extent as the United States and that it has adopted the best and most effective platforms through direct purchases, retrofits of existing materiel and theft of intellectual property. 


Let's focus on China's military doctrine and strategy.  There are eight strategic tasks that China's military must be prepared to execute:


1.) Safeguard the sovereignty of China’s territory.

2.) Safeguard national unification.

3.) Safeguard China’s interests in new domains, such as space and cyberspace.

4.) Safeguard China’s overseas interests.

5.) Maintain strategic deterrence.

6.) Participate in international security cooperation.

7.) Maintain China’s political security and social stability.

8.) Conduct emergency rescue, disaster relief, and “rights and interest protection” missions.

These tasks are viewed as necessary for China to claim "great power status".

China's ultimate goal is to "...build a strong, combat-effective force capable of winning regional conflicts and employing integrated real-time command and control networks."  China's military strategy involves "active defense", a tactic that involves being strategically defensive but operationally offensive.  Once China ascertains that an adversary has damaged or intends to damage one of China's strategic interests, China will be justified in responding defensively even if the adversary has not yet conducted offensive military operations.  It's mandate at that point will be to both deescalate a conflict and seize the initiative during a conflict.  


In 2015, China's political leadership stated that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) should be capable of fighting and winning modern local wars (i.e. operating in the digital age where advanced information and communications technology is used) with an emphasis on maritime military operations. To enhance its combat effectiveness, the PLA reduced the number of its military theatres from seven to five as shown on this map:



These theatres which are located along China's periphery show the nation's domestic geographic areas of strategic importance as shown here:  



China is also making significant moves to modernize the PLA's command and control systems.  These new systems will allow the PLA to share intelligence, battlefield information, logistical information and weather reports which will improve commanders' situational awareness in time of battle.  


According to the paper, there is one very interesting aspect of China's military evolution.  China's leadership feels that they are experiencing a "period of strategic opportunity during which it can pursue development without a major military conflict".  China's actions in the South and East China Seas are examples where China has been able to flex its territorial muscles and claim disputed territory without provoking the United States or other neighbouring nations into actual military conflict or the imposition of significant international economic sanctions.  The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has also allowed China to expand from its original goal of the offshore defense of China's territorial waters to a more global presence including United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa and the establishment of the PLA's first overseas military base in Djibouti as shown on this map:



...and this satellite photograph which shows the base while under construction:


China's Djibouti base is projected to have a contingent of up to 10,000 soldiers until at least 2026 when the agreement between China and Djibouti is set to expire.

It is interesting to see how China's military strategy is evolving to one where it is no longer restricted to its own relatively small part of the globe and that it has adopted a philosophy of pursuing military operations without arousing the outright ire of the United States.  The global expansion of China's military and its significant spending on the latest in military hardware tells us one thing; it is becoming increasingly apparent that the global economic and strategic centre is shifting toward the Asia - Pacific region, particularly China, and that American hegemony in the Western Pacific is under significant threat.  No doubt this will come as good news to the American military - industrial - intelligence community because it means that Washington is likely to step up spending on defense in order to protect American interests around the globe.  Unfortunately, this also means that, at some point, American taxpayers will find themselves having to remit more of their hard-earned dollars to Washington so that the U.S. military can stay ahead of China.


Tuesday, June 4, 2019

Global Military Spending - 2018 Edition

With Mike Pompeo and John Bolton rattling the sabre at just about every turn, the recent report on global military expenditures for 2018 by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is particularly pertinent.  Here are some of the highlights that will help you to better understand how much governments around the world spend on equipment that is solely designed to killing maim as many human beings as possible.

In 2018, total global military expenditures rose by 2.6 percent on a year-over-year basis, reaching a record $1.822 trillion in nominal terms.  This is the highest level since 1988, the first year for which consistent global military spending data is available.  Given that the Cold War ended in 1991, it is interesting to note that global military spending is now 76 percent higher than the post-Cold War low in 1998.

Here is a graph showing how global military spending has grown since 1988:


Total global military spending in 2018 represented 2.1 percent of global gross domestic product or $239 per person. 

Here is a pie chart showing the 15 top global military spenders:


In 2018, military spending by the United States and China accounted for half of the world's total military spending.

Let's look at military spending in 2018 by three of the big players in our new multipolar world:

1.) United States - For the first time since 2010, U.S. military spending grew by 4.6 percent on a year-over-year basis, reaching $649.798 billion.  This is almost as much as was spent by the next eight largest-spending nations combined.  Over the past decade, in constant 2017  U.S. dollars, U.S. military spending has actually dropped from a peak of $784.835 billion in 2010.  As a share of GDP, over the past decade, U.S. military spending has dropped from a peak of 4.7 percent in 2010 to its current level of 3.2 percent.  During the Cold War era, U.S. military spending comprised 5.7 percent of GDP in 1988 and 5.5 percent of GDP in 1989.  After the Cold War ended, U.S. military spending actually dropped to a low of 2.9 percent of GDP in the years between 1999 and 2001 but began to grow again in 2002 as the War on Terror was undertaken. 

2.) China - For the 24th consecutive year, China's spending on its military grew hitting a growth rate of 5.0 percent on a year-over-year basis in 2018 and reaching a total of $249.997 billion, 10 times higher than in 1994.  The spending by China accounts for 14 percent of global military spending.  In constant 2017 U.S. dollars, China's military spending has grown continuously particularly in the last decade where it has grown from $108.187 billion in 2008 to its current level of just under $250 billion.  In 2018, China's military spending as a share of its economy was 1.9 percent.  As a share of GDP over the past decade, China's military spending has remained in a very constant range of between 1.9 percent and 2.1 percent of GDP.  Back in the late 1980s and early 1990s, China's spending on its military was as high as 2.5 percent of GDP, still a fraction of what the United States was spending on its military.

3.) Russia - In 2018, Russia's military spending actually dropped by 3.5 percent on a year-over-year basis for the second year in a row, declining to $61.4 billion or less than one-tenth of what the United States spent on its military in 2018.   In constant 2017 U.S. dollars, Russia's military spending is actually dropping after hitting a high of $82.576 billion in 2016, dropping by 25.7 percent over two years.  In 2018, Russia's military spending as a share of its economy was 3.9 percent.  As a share of GDP, over the past decade, Russia's military spending has ranged from 3.1 percent to 5.5 percent.    Just after the end of the Cold War, Russia's military spending as a share of its economy was as high as 4.5 percent (1994) but fell to a range of between 2.7 percent and 3.8 percent in the decade after the end of the Cold War.

The perception of a threat by Russia's military has impacted military spending levels by its neighbours during 2018.  Spending by Poland rose by 8.9 percent on a year-over-year basis to $11.6 billion, spending by Ukraine rose by 21 percent to $4.8 billion and spending by Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania grew in a range of between 18 percent and 24 percent over the year.

As you can see from this data, global spending on technology that is designed to win wars and  both create and deter threats continues to consume a significant portion of global resources.  Despite the fact that the Cold War ended almost three decades ago, it is interesting to see the impact that the current Russian - United States friction has created and how it has resulted in a very significant increase in spending by the United States and its central and Eastern European vassal states.  On the upside, in the case of American military spending, at least some Americans are growing very wealthy on the backs of taxpayers who fund the hundreds of billions of dollars in military spending.  On the downside, they aren't necessarily getting much for their tax dollars. 

Thursday, January 17, 2019

Donald Trump and the Global Arms Race

While the American media and late night hosts focus on Donald Trump's tweets that make him look like a cartoon president, tweets like this one from December 3, 2018 go pretty much unnoticed:




Let's look at some statistics.  Here is a graphic showing how total global military expenditures as a percentage of GDP has dropped over the last six decades, thanks in large part to the end of the Cold War:


From a high of 6.165 percent in 1960, military expenditures have dropped to their current level (2017) of 2.177 percent, the lowest in nearly 60 years.

Here is a graphic showing how United States military expenditures as a percentage of GDP has varied over the last six decades:


After peaking at just over 9 percent in 1967 (thanks to the war in Vietnam), U.S. military expenditures have fallen to 3.149 percent of GDP.

Here is a graphic showing how Russian Federation military expenditures as a percentage of GDP has varied since 1992:


The Russian Federation's military expenditures dropped to a low of 3.0 percent of GDP in 1998, rose to a high of 5.504 percent in 2016 and fell back to 4.262 percent in 2017.

Here is a graphic showing how China's military expenditures as a percentage of GDP has varied since 1989:


Compared to the United States and Russia, China's military expenditures have been relatively stable, ranging from a high of 2.493 percent of GDP in 1990 to a low of 1.675 percent in 1997.  Currently, China's spending on its military is 1.909 percent of its GDP.

Let's compare military spending for the world's three largest military powers on a current U.S. dollar basis:


As you can clearly see, when measured in terms of current U.S. dollars, the United States spends the most on its military, particularly when one considers the the defense budget for the United States in fiscal 2019 rose to $686 billion ($716 billion if national security is included).

Here is a graphic from the Peter G. Peterson Foundation that compares U.S. military spending to that of the next seven largest military spending nations:


Here is a graphic, also from the Peter G. Peterson Foundation, that compares U.S. military spending as a percentage of GDP to that of the next seven largest military spending nations over the years between 1972 and 2017:


Let's close this posting by looking at a partial list of what U.S. taxpayers can expect to get from the $686 billion defense budget for fiscal 2019:

Aircraft

77 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters - $10.7 billion
15 KC-46 Tanker Replacements - $3.0 billion
24 F/A-18s - $2.0 billion
60 AH-64E Attack Helicopters - $1.3 billion
6 VH-92 Presidential Helicopters - $0.9 billion
10 P-8A Aircraft - $2.2 billion
8 CH-53K King Stallion - $1.6 billion

Shipbuilding

2 Virginia Class Submarines - $7.4 billion
3 DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Destroyers - $6.0 billion
1 Littoral Combat Ship - $1.3 billion
CVN-78 Class Aircraft Carrier - $1.8 billion
2 Fleet Replenishment Oilers (T-AO) - $1.1 billion
1 Expeditionary Sea Base - $0.7 billion

Ground Systems

5,113 Joint Light Tactical Vehicles - $2.0 billion
135 M-1 Abrams Tank Modifications - $2.7 billion
30 Amphibious Combat Vehicles - $0.3 billion
197 Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicles - $0.8 billion

Space Investments

5 Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles - $2.0 billion
Global Positioning System - $1.5 billion
Space Based Infrared System - $0.8 billion

Missile Defense

43 AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense (SM-3) - $1.7 billion
Ground Based Midcourse Defense - $2.1 billion
82 THAAD Ballistic Missile Defense - $1.1 billion
240 Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) Missile Segment Enhancements - $1.1 billion

Munitions

43,594 Joint Direct Attack Munitions - $1.2 billion
9,733 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) - $1.2 billion
6,826 Small Diameter Bomb I - $0.3 billion
1,260 Small Diameter Bomb II - $0.4 billion
7,045 Hellfire Missiles - $0.6 billion
360 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range - $0.6 billion
1,121 Joint Air-to-Ground Missiles - $0.3 billion

Nuclear Triad

B-21 Long Range Strike Bomber - $2.3 billion
Columbia Class Submarine - $3.7 billion
Long-Range Stand-Off Missile - $0.6 billion
Ground Based Strategic Deterrent - $0.3 billon

That's a pretty sweet shopping list if you happen to be a corner office dweller at one of America's defense contractors!

While there is no doubt that there is a lot of nonsense tweeted by America's current president, his tweet of December 3, 2018 flies right in the face of America's military-industrial complex and its demands from Washington.  Without Washington spending hundreds of billions of dollars on goods manufactured by America's defense industry, these businesses would be a lot less profitable, resulting in far lower compensation for its senior executives.  Unfortunately, much of America's mainstream media will proclaim that, should Donald Trump try to negotiate reduced military spending by the three largest militaries in the world, he will have sold out his own military just to placate the Russians and the Chinese.