The Colossal Failure in Afghanistan

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction or SIGAR just released the third edition of its High-Risk List to the 116th Congress of the United States and the Secretaries of both State and Defense.  In this report, SIGAR identifies the most serious threats to the American government's $132 billion reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.  This information is of particular interest and importance given that negotiations are currently underway to end the United States' involvement in Afghanistan, involvement that began on October 7, 2001, making this the longest military engagement in American history.

The report opens with this rather sobering summary of the past, present and future in Afghanistan:

"The $132 billion appropriated since 2002 for Afghanistan’s reconstruction has been used to train and equip Afghan security forces, strengthen government institutions, promote the rule of law, protect women’s rights, improve health and education, and stimulate economic development, among other objectives.

Yet the gains from our nation’s investment in Afghanistan’s reconstruction face multiple threats: continued insecurity, endemic corruption, weak Afghan institutions, the insidious impact of the narcotics trade, and inadequate coordination and oversight by donors.

While an equitable and sustainable peace agreement in Afghanistan could end much of the violence that presents the greatest threat to the reconstruction effort, a peace agreement may bring its own set of challenges to sustaining the gains that the United States, its Coalition partners, and the Afghan government have achieved over that time." (my bold)

Here is a listing of the eight current high risk areas:

1.) Widespread Insecurity - whether a peace plan is put into place or not, Afghanistan is likely to continue to experience multiple violent extremist organizations.  The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces require annual funding of between $4 billion and $5 billion to remain viable.

2.) Underdeveloped Civil Policing Capability - The United States has spent more effort reconstructing the Afghan National Army than on the Afghan National Police meaning that there is no strategy for a competent civil police force backed by rule of law.  Sustaining a national police force will require significant foreign funding.

3.) Endemic Corruption - Corruption is endemic and forms a significant threat to the Afghan government.  This means that reconstruction programs will continue to be subverted and are likely to fail.  Here is a graphic from Transparency International showing where Afghanistan lies on the global spectrum when it comes to corruption:

Afghanistan has the world's 9th lowest corruption score as shown on this list:

4.) Sluggish Economic Growth - Afghanistan's legal economy is sluggish and there are numerous barriers to further economic growth.

5.) Illicit Narcotics Trade - Afghanistan remains the world's largest producer of opium poppies and had the two highest years of cultivation in 2017 and 2018.  Funds from the illicit drug trade fund the Taliban, corrupt members of the Afghan government, military and police and also employ 600,000 Afghanis.

6.) Threats to Women's Rights - More than $1 billion has been spent since 2002 to advance the status of women in Afghanistan but gains made so far are fragile, particularly in rural areas, and are likely to be unprotected should the Taliban be part of a peace settlement.

7.) Challenge of Reintegration - The social, economic and political reintegration of tens of thousands of former fighters back into Afghan society will be difficult, particularly in light of the nation's weak economy and political uncertainty and distrust.  

8.) Restricted Oversight - If a peace settlement includes reductions in foreign personnel providing oversight on foreign funded programs, problems in the nation will only increase thanks to high levels of corruption.

Let's look at some examples of where U.S. tax dollars have been spent in Afghanistan.  Since 2001, an estimated $780 billion has been appropriated for Afghanistan including war funding, diplomatic and consular programs, military and embassy construction projects etcetera.  Of this $738 billion or 95 percent of the total was obligated by the Department of Defense.  Reconstruction costs make up 15 percent of total U.S. funds obligated for Afghanistan since 2001 and are broken down as follows:

1.) Security - $83.1 billion (63 percent of the total) to build up Afghan military and police.  In fiscal 2019, 82 percent of the funds appropriated for Afghanistan reconstruction were spent on assisting the security sector.  The "success" of this program can be put into perspective with this map showing the areas of Afghanistan that are under control of the Taliban, the original target of Operation Enduring Freedom:

2.) Governance and Economic Development - $33.9 billion (26 percent of the total).  In fiscal 2018, only 12 percent of the funds appropriated for Afghanistan reconstruction were spent on improving the nation's economy. 

3.) Counternarcotics Programs - $8.9 billion (7 percent of the total).

The remaining 4 percent of reconstruction funds have been spent to support civilian operations, humanitarian initiatives and in combating society-wide corruption.

Let's close by looking at a few quotes from the report that show just how dire the situation in Afghanistan still is nearly 18 years after Operation Enduring Freedom began and how unlikely a peace settlement is likely to change the situation on the ground:

1.) Failure to successfully reintegrate an estimated 60,000 Taliban fighters and their families, and other illegal armed groups, could undermine the successful implementation of any peace agreement.

2.) The opium trade plays a significant role in the Afghan economy and it is difficult to see how a peace accord between the Afghan government and the insurgency would translate into the collapse or contraction of the illicit drug trade. The country requires a growing economy or favorable economic conditions to provide farmers and former insurgents with legitimate employment and a reliable income to replace opium poppy cultivation. The Afghan government also needs to pursue major drug traffickers, which it has not done consistently or successfully. According to the Department of Justice, “certain influential people are above the law.”

3.) Effective policing will require a force that gives citizens the presumption of innocence rather than anticipating and taking preemptive offensive operations against perceived threats. U.S. agencies, such as the Justice Department, currently lack the personnel numbers and para-military strength to accompany Afghan National Police trainees into high-threat districts.

4.) In a post-settlement environment, depending on the terms of an agreement, there may also be the challenge of integrating former Taliban fighters into the national security forces and society.  These issues could become more acute should international financial and military support decline sharply before, during, or after peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban.

Let's close this sobering view of Afghanistan's future with an excerpt from the prepared remarks given by the the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, John F. Sopko that accompanied the release of the report:

"If the U.S. reduces its presence in Afghanistan but feels compelled to provide significant financial support for reconstruction, there may be little choice but to provide a greater proportion of funding as on-budget assistance. But if that road is taken, assistance should be conditioned on an independent finding that adequate monitoring mechanisms and internal controls for the Afghan ministry or multilateral trust fund in question are in place.

If those conditions are lacking and assistance is provided anyway, we may as well set the cash ablaze on the streets of Kabul for all the good it will do.

I urge Congress to not just think about how much money should be given, but also to think about how that money will be provided and monitored. If the need for oversight is ignored or sidelined, both the American taxpayer and the Afghan people will suffer, even with a successful peace agreement."  (my bold)

At the very least, it appears that 18 years of war has accomplished almost nothing when it comes to meaningful and permanent changes in Afghanistan despite the spending of hundreds of billions of hard-earned taxpayers' dollars.

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The Enduring Costs of Operation Enduring Freedom

The Presidential election in Afghanistan is another step in the nation's decades-long rebuilding process.  Taxpayers in several key nations, mainly the United States, who supplied the original troops and materiel in the ongoing battle against the Taliban and terrorism have seen costs mount to a stunning level as the years since 2001 have passed.

According to the National Priorities Project, every hour, American taxpayers are paying $10.17 million for the cost of "Operation Enduring Freedom" in Afghanistan with the total spent now in excess of $707.6 billion.  Here is a graph showing the total spending on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan between fiscal 2002 and fiscal 2012 according to a 2013 analysis by the for Strategic and International Studies:

Obviously, it's not just the spending on the military that is so costly for American taxpayers.  Here is a graphic showing U.S. spending on reconstruction in Afghanistan over the same timeframe:

There are human costs to Operation Enduring Freedom as well.  Since hostilities began in 2001, there have been 2312 American military deaths in Afghanistan as shown on this chart from the Department of Defense:

In addition, there have been 19,694 soldiers wounded in action in operations related to Operation Enduring Freedom.

According to a March 2013 study by Linda J. Bilmes at the Harvard Kennedy School, the total cost of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq will reach between $4 trillion and $6 trillion when long-term medical care of veterans and their families is included.  It is expected that the peak costs for these expenses could occur as long as 50 years down the road if prior post-war veteran experiences are assumed.  Since approximately 2.5 million service men and women have served in both theatres, the costs are expected to rise from $134.3 billion in 2013 to $836.1 billion for future medical care and disability benefits as shown on this chart:

Here are the costs borne by taxpayers in two other nations that participated in the  Afghan hostilities: 

The Cost to the United Kingdom:

In addition, the war in Afghanistan has cost the United Kingdom at least £37 billion pounds including military costs of £31.1 billion, veterans' costs of £3.8 billion and civilian development costs of £2.1 billion.  Between October 7, 2001 and February 28, 2014, the following United Kingdom military and civilian casualties took place in Afghanistan:

In addition, there have been 2173 civilians and military personnel wounded in action over the same time period.

The Cost to Canada:

It is extremely difficult to get accurate and up-to-date estimates of the cost of Canada's mission to Afghanistan, however, the Canadian government provided an incremental cost (i.e. spending above and beyond normal spending on the Armed Forces) for the period between 2001 to 2011 of $11.3 billion, excluding the cost of veterans' care after 2011.  Canada also lost 158 soldiers in the battle along with one diplomat, one journalist and two civilian contractors.  Approximately 5515 Canadians who have served in Afghanistan are currently being assisted by Veterans' Affairs Canada.

As shown on this chart, a total of 3429 coalition military fatalities have occurred in Afghanistan since 2001 with the peak year being in 2010 when 711 soldiers were killed, 58 percent of them by improvised explosive devices (IEDs):

The cost to Afghani civilians has also been very high.  According to The United Nations Annual Report on Afghanistan for 2013, deaths and injuries among Afghani civilians has been very high for many years as shown on this graph:

Since 2009, IEDs have been responsible for the deaths of 4515 civilians and an additional 7989 have been injured in 3716 separate IED attacks.  A study by Brown University estimates that a total of between 18,000 and 20,000 Afghani civilians have died as a result of the conflict since 2001.

Let's close with a graph that shows the top contributors to Afghanistan's Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) as of the end of 2013 (note that SY stands for Solar Year where SY 1381 is the period between March 21, 2002 and March 20, 2003):

From 2002 to February 2014, the World Bank reports that 33 donor nations had pledged more than $7.809 billion to reconstruction projects in Afghanistan with $6.941 billion being paid in.  In 2013 alone, the United States contributed $300 million or 33 percent of the annual ARTF total of $903.72 million.  Projects undertaken include everything from highway construction to irrigation to restoring operations at universities and schools.

The cost of the War on Terror has far exceeded the original estimates provided to American taxpayers by the Bush II Administration.  One has to question whether there will be any long-term and lasting benefit to Afghanistan and Afghanis for the trillions of dollars "invested" and whether the world will really be a safer place for all of the sacrifices made.